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ABSTRACT 
What happens after an international court finds a state has violated 
international law? Many realize today that states often fail to comply with 
such judgments. International courts like the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECHR”) have to rely on the help of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (“NGOs”) to shame states into compliance. In 2011, the body 
charged with enforcing judgments of the ECHR launched a new website 
dedicated to publishing reports by NGOs that criticize states for 
noncompliance with ECHR judgments. This website published hundreds of 
reports, as well as the responses of some accused states. The Article analyzes 
all the reports published in the first four years since the website was created. 
This analysis, together with interviews with many of the NGO lawyers 
involved, sheds light on the way reputational sanctions work in international 
law. It reveals that NGOs focus most of their attention on legally important 
cases and on cases that address severe violations. It also shows that NGOs 
focus on states that usually comply with their international obligations 
instead of on states that regularly fail to comply with international law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (“CM”) is the 
body charged with enforcing judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECHR”). Although the CM is theoretically able to expel a state 
from the Council of Europe, it has never done so and cannot credibly threaten 
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to use this extreme step. To convince states to comply with ECHR 
judgments, the CM must rely on publicly shaming the states by exposing 
their defiant behavior in its discussions and in public documents it releases, 
which are known as “interim resolutions.” As the number of disobeyed 
judgments increased, the CM was pushed to devise a new strategy to make 
states comply. 
This strategy was the creation in 2011 of a website dedicated to 
publishing reports1 by Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”). The 
 
 1. It is important to stress that NGOs began filing reports long before the DEJ website was created; 
they have been filing since May 2006 when Rule 9 was amended and allowed them to intervene. Yet 
these reports were not transparent and accessible to the public unless NGOs deliberately published them 
on their own websites or in publications. See, e.g., RUSSIAN JUSTICE INITIATIVE, IMPLEMENTATION 
RESOURCES AND MATERIALS, http://www.srji.org/en/implementation/materials/ [https://perma.cc/G7HB 
-TE4Y]. Reports that do not appear on the DEJ website are excluded from the analysis here. 
All reports were downloaded from the Council of Europe online database. Council of Europe, Latest 
Documents, http://www.coe.int/en/web/cm/latest-documents [https://perma.cc/X7ES-N88D] (reports 
originally accessed on Dec. 4 2014 from the previous version of this website, 
http://www.coe.int/t/cm/System/WCDsearch.asp?ShowRes=yes&FilingPlan=fplCM-Supervision9_2& 
Language=lanEnglish&ShowBreak=yes&SortBy=Geo&Sector=secCM&ShowFullTextSearch=yes& 
ResultTitle=Information%20from%20NGOs%20and%20National%20human%20rights%20institu-
tions). This database keeps reports also on judgments that were closed by the CM, including some of the 
cases analyzed here. In addition, on Oct. 31, 2013, all reports were downloaded from another part of the 
website, which contains all communications received on pending cases: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monito 
ring/execution/Themes/Add_info/Info_cases_en.asp [https://perma.cc/MQT5-VUHQ]. While cases 
could be closed and would not appear on the second website, as were some cases in the sample, they 
continue to appear on the first, specialized website that should contain all reports. Yet, some reports are 
missing from the first website, although they appeared on the second website. These were included in my 
sample to give the most accurate picture of the reports actually filed and accessible on at least one CM 
website. Almost all of them are reports issued in the infancy of the website in 2010 or 2011 and may have 
been unintentionally omitted from the specialized first website. The number of these missing reports are 
(2010)410, (2010)407, (2010)398, (2011)698, (2010)336, (2011)298, (2011)680, (2013)380, (2011)787, 
(2010)610. All ten reports concern cases that were still pending on Jan. 28, 2015. 
Another oddity worth mentioning are three reports dating from 2007–2008 against France that were 
later published in the first website although they were clearly filed long before the website was created 
together with many other cases that were never published. These reports are (2007)600, (2007)531, 
(2008)119, which all address the same case: app. no. 25389/05 Gaberamadhien v. France. Even an official 
at ANAFE, the organization that filed the three reports, could not tell why they were published so late 
after they were filed while similar reports were not. See Conversation with Official at ANAFE 
(Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers) on 27/5/15. These reports were 
included in the database to give the most accurate picture of the CM website. 
All information about the current status of the cases in the CM and communications filed regarding 
them was coded or updated in December 2014 and January 2015. This information was collected from 
queries at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp and from data 
on resolutions and documents filed taken from other places in the CM’s website. 
The CM now has a new and elegant website at http://www.coe.int/cs/web/execution/submissions. 
One can find there information about submissions by states, applicants, NGOs, and national human rights 
institutions (NHRIs) categorized by the relevant state. One can access specifically information submitted 
by NGOs and NHRIs at https://search.coe.int/cm#title=Information% 20from%20NGOs%20and%20nati 
onal%20human%20rights%20institutions#showSearchBar=static#k=*#f=%5B%7B%22p%22%3A%22
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reports accuse states of failing to fully comply with judgments of the ECHR. 
They are published promptly, together with any response from the state 
accused of non-compliance. In this way, hundreds of organizations can 
participate in exposing the non-compliant actions of states. NGOs can learn 
about state behavior from each other, add their own observations in new 
reports, and spread this information further in their publications. 
From the creation of the website until December 2014, 266 NGO 
reports were published, targeting compliance with 137 ECHR judgments. 
This Article analyzes all these reports, along with information from 
interviews with NGO activists who submitted them. The Article suggests 
that NGOs focus mainly on cases of significant legal importance and on 
issues that concern severe human rights violations. Furthermore, NGOs 
focus on states that are usually compliant with international law—so-called 
“high-reputation states.” 
These findings shed light on the way reputational sanctions work in 
international law. Apparently, allowing numerous NGOs that are very 
different from each other to use shaming sanctions can help focus most of 
the attention on the cases that matter the most legally and morally. Moreover, 
states that have built a high reputation through years of good behavior are 
shamed more often than regularly misbehaving states. The reason for this 
seems to be that states which acquired a good reputation have more to lose 
from accusations of inadequate behavior. They are, therefore, more likely to 
improve their behavior if their noncompliance is exposed. This, in turn, gives 
NGOs an incentive to target these high-reputation states instead of wasting 
efforts on states that do not care much about their reputation. 
Scholars have noted that once an international court issues a judgment, 
state compliance is not guaranteed. In fact, compliance can be partial or 
delayed.2 This Article adds to this literature. It joins those scholars who argue 
that the level of state compliance often depends on the actions of individuals 
and organizations interacting with the government of that state.3 NGOs play 
 
CoEFilter%22%2C%22i%22%3A1%2C%22o%22%3A1%2C%22m%22%3A0%2C%22ix%22%3A1
%2C%22value%22%3A%22Information%20from%20NGOs%20%26%20National%20HR%20instituti
ons%20(Rule%209.2)%22%7D%5D [https://perma.cc/QTZ6-48MQ]. 
 2. See Alexandra Huneeus, Compliance with Judgments and Decisions, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 437, 443–45 (Cesare P. R. Romano, Karen J. Alter, & 
Yuval Shany eds., 2013) (explaining the difficulties of measuring state compliance with international 
judgments and referring to empirical studies of compliance); YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 120–23 (2014) (studying the factors that affect compliance 
with international judgments). 
 3. See COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 135 (2014) (arguing that domestic actors are essential for 
securing compliance with human rights judgments of international courts). 
DOTHAN - FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2017  12:11 PM 
2017] A VIRTUAL WALL OF SHAME 145 
an important role in this regard,4 but they are constrained by their limited 
abilities5 and their intervention does not necessarily have a positive effect.6 
Therefore, to fulfill its goal of enforcing ECHR judgments, the CM must be 
sensitive to the complex reality unfolded in this Article.7 
Part I describes the ECHR and the CM, with special emphasis on the 
new website where NGOs can publish reports on states’ noncompliance. Part 
II shows which types of judgments attract the most NGO attention. Part III 
presents the type of states that are the subject of increased NGO attention. 
Part IV offers data about the NGOs involved in filing reports, including 
insights from a series of interviews with NGO activists. Part V explores 
potential reasons for inaccuracies in the way the international community 
perceives states’ reputations and suggests that the involvement of NGOs may 
improve the community’s reputational assessments. Part VI concludes by 
highlighting how the Article’s findings lend empirical support to a key 
argument made in the literature on reputation—that high-reputation states 
stand to lose more than low-reputation states when targeted by a reputational 
sanction. 
I. THE ECHR AND ITS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM 
A. The ECHR 
The ECHR is an international human rights court located in Strasbourg, 
France. It has jurisdiction over violations of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms8 (the 
“Convention”) committed by the forty-seven member states comprising the 
Council of Europe. The Convention protects key human rights such as the 
right to life and the right to freedom from torture,9 as well as numerous other 
 
 4. See id. at 24 (arguing that NGOs can pressure governments and shame them into compliance 
with international judgments). 
 5. See Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by 
an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 67–68 (2004) (asserting that shaming 
by NGOs is effective mainly when the violation, the identity of the violator, and the necessary remedy 
are clear). 
 6. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights 
Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689, 707 (2008) (showing that countries which are shamed for 
human rights abuses often improve their protection of political rights; however, shaming sometimes leads 
to increased political terror). 
 7. See Başak Çali & Anne Koch, Foxes Guarding the Foxes? The Peer Review of Human Rights 
Judgments by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 301, 324 (2014) 
(suggesting that CM procedures improve the prospects of compliance with ECHR judgments). 
 8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222, as amended by Protocols No. 3 (Sept. 21, 1970), 5 (Dec. 20, 1971), 8 (Jan. 1, 1990), 11 
(Nov. 1, 1998), and 14 (June 1, 2010) [hereinafter The Convention]. 
 9. Id. at arts. 2 and 3, respectively. 
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rights such as the right to a fair trial, to privacy, and to freedom of religion.10 
The Convention also requires states to provide effective remedies for any 
violation and not to discriminate between individuals.11 
Individuals, groups, and NGOs can bring cases to the ECHR as 
applicants if they were victims of violations.12 States can also bring cases 
against other states even if they were not victims of violations,13 but they 
rarely do so.14 The ECHR employs forty-seven permanent judges—one 
judge for each state in the Council of Europe.15 The court sits in panels of 
various sizes: single-judge Formations, Committees of three judges, 
Chambers of seven judges and a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges.16 Most 
of the ECHR’s significant cases are issued by Chambers, with the Grand 
Chamber reserved only for issues of extreme legal importance.17 
Over the years, the number of cases reaching the ECHR has sky-
rocketed. While the court received 45,000 cases in the first forty-three years 
of its existence,18 in 2013 alone it received more than 65,000 cases.19 To 
address this flood of cases, the ECHR has undergone several reforms. In 
1998, the commission previously responsible for screening cases before they 
reached the ECHR was abolished,20 and in 2010, single-judge Formations 
 
 10. Id. at arts. 6, 8, and 9, respectively. 
 11. Id. at arts. 13 and 14, respectively. 
 12. Id. at art. 34. 
 13. Id. at art. 33. 
 14. See Dragoljub Popovic, Prevailing of Judicial Activism over Self-Restraint in the Jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 361, 372 (2009) (arguing that more than 
ninety-five percent of the cases brought before the court were not applications by states). 
 15. Every state in the Council of Europe can suggest a list of three candidates to the parliamentary 
assembly from which the assembly selects one judge. See The Convention, supra note 8, at arts. 20, 22. 
 16. The Convention, supra note 8, at art. 27. 
 17. A Chamber that received a case may decide to pass the case to a Grand Chamber if it finds the 
case raises a serious question of interpretation, or if the case might lead to a digression from prior 
judgments. If the Chamber issues a judgment, it does not become immediately final. Within three months 
after the Chamber judgment, a party to the dispute can, in exceptional cases, ask for a referral to the Grand 
Chamber. A panel of five judges will allow the case to be heard again by a Grand Chamber if the case 
raises a significant issue of interpretation or an issue of great importance. If three months have passed 
since the Chamber judgment and neither party has requested a referral, if both parties have declared they 
do not wish to refer the case, or if the court has decided to reject a referral request, the Chamber judgment 
will become final. See The Convention, supra note 8, at arts. 30–31, 42–44. 
 18. From 1955 to 1998, 45,000 applications were allocated to judicial formations. See EUR. CT. 
H.R., ANNUAL REPORT 2009 11 (2009), http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C25277F5-BCAE-4401-
BC9B-F58D015E4D54/0/2009_Annual_Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VKM-QLFR]. 
 19. In 2013, 65,900 applications were allocated to judicial formations. See EUR. CT. H.R., 
ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2013 4 (Jan. 2014), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2013_ 
ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DZK-QW5K]. 
 20. In Protocol 11, which was accepted on November 1, 1998. 
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were authorized to reject plainly inadmissible cases.21 Consequently, the 
ECHR processes an increasingly large volume of cases. In 2013, it disposed 
of more than 93,000 cases, reducing the court’s accumulated backlog to 
slightly less than 100,000.22 
ECHR judgments finding states in violation of the Convention are 
legally binding. States must comply with these judgments by choosing the 
appropriate means to remedy the violation.23 These means can range from 
specific measures such as releasing prisoners to general measures such as 
amending statutes.24 If parties harmed by violations have not been 
compensated by the state’s domestic laws, the ECHR can grant them “just 
satisfaction,” which are reparations to cover their harms. 
The ECHR cannot enforce its judgments. This task is left entirely to the 
CM. Though some scholars argue that states regularly comply with ECHR 
judgments,25 many are concerned that a large number of the cases reaching 
the court are in fact repetitive cases—cases arising from structural defects 
that were not resolved and continue to harm numerous applicants. To better 
address these structural defects, the court occasionally issues so-called “pilot 
judgments”—judgments that prescribe specific actions to remedy the 
violation.26 
B. The Committee of Ministers 
The CM monitors compliance with the ECHR’s judgments together 
with the Department of Execution of Judgments (“DEJ”).27 These bodies are 
charged with supervising both the individual measures necessary to amend a 
violation vis-à-vis the applicant, including the payment of just satisfaction, 
and the general measures necessary to prevent similar violations, such as 
constitutional or statutory amendments. Theoretically, the CM can expel 
states from the Council of Europe, but this severe measure has never been 
 
 21. In Protocol 14, which came into force on June 1, 2010. Protocol 14 also allows three-judge 
Committees to declare admissible and decide on the merits cases that are clearly well-founded. 
Furthermore, the Protocol allows the court to declare cases inadmissible if they create no significant 
disadvantage to the applicant and do not raise an important legal question. 
 22. In 2013, 93,396 applications were processed. This reduced the court’s backlog from 128,100 
cases at the beginning of the year to 99,900 cases at its end. See ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2013, supra 
note 19, at 4. 
 23. The Convention, supra note 8, at art. 46. 
 24. See Scozzari and Guinta v. Italy [GC], 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 471. 
 25. See Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
115, 119 (2011) (presenting the research on compliance rates with the ECHR and arguing that by most 
accounts compliance rates are high). 
 26. See Broniowski v. Poland [GC], 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
 27. The Convention, supra note 8, at art. 46(2). 
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used.28 In practice, the CM therefore limits itself to spreading information 
and shaming states into compliance. 
After a final judgment is issued against a state, the DEJ begins to 
negotiate with the state about how to remedy the violation. After this initial 
stage, which should last no more than six months, the state is required to 
submit an “action report.” The report describes the measures the state took 
to comply and a timeline for the measures it intends to take. If a state does 
not comply quickly enough, the CM may examine its actions regularly and 
request that the state act in certain ways. If the state continues to delay 
compliance, the CM may issue a public proclamation called “interim 
resolution” condemning the state for noncompliance and urging it to change 
its practices.29 
The CM divides its efforts of supervision into two separate tracks. Most 
cases are directed to the track called “standard procedure.” Some cases that 
need closer attention, such as cases that require urgent action or involve 
severe structural problems, are directed to the “enhanced procedure” track. 
Cases supervised under this “enhanced procedure” are regularly raised in the 
CM meetings.30 
The CM categorizes cases that deal with general wide-spread 
problems—and consequently require general measures of remediation—as 
“Leading Cases.”31 The CM supervises compliance with a Leading Case 
together with the repetitive cases that result from the same violation. 
In 2011, the DEJ created a website that publishes all the information 
about states’ compliance, including action reports submitted by the states and 
interim resolutions issued against them. This new source of information 
allows civil society to monitor states’ compliance behavior and shape states’ 
reputations. 
 
 28. See Statute of the Council of Europe, art. 8, 5 May 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103 (stating that the CM 
may suspend the representation rights of states that violate their commitment to the Council of Europe or 
even expel such states from the Council). While no state has been expelled under this provision, Greece 
withdrew from the Council of Europe in 1969 under a possible threat of expulsion. See Dothan, supra 
note 25, at 119, 139. 
 29. Lucja Miara & Victoria Prais, The Role of Civil Society in the Execution of Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 528, 531 (2012). 
 30. If the most crucial elements of compliance are completed, such cases might be downgraded to 
“standard procedure.” In contrast, in cases of persistent noncompliance, a case might be upgraded from 
“standard procedure” to “enhanced procedure.” See id. at 532. 
 31. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 7TH ANN. REP. OF THE COMM. OF MINISTERS 33 (2013). 
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C. Rule 9.2 Procedure 
Rule 9.2 of the CM Rules allows the CM to consider communications 
from NGOs and national institutions for the protection of human rights.32 
Thus, NGOs are not only passive recipients of information. Rather, they can 
share their own views about states’ compliance with the CM. The NGO 
reports are sent to the state, which is given five days to respond to them if it 
wishes. After five days, both the report and the state’s response, if there was 
any, are promptly published on the DEJ’s website.33 
The reports in the database analyzed in this Article were filed by over 
two hundred NGOs of diverse characteristics and backgrounds. Surprisingly, 
large and well-funded organizations such as Amnesty or Human Rights 
Watch were responsible only for a few of the reports in the database.34 In 
contrast, some reports were filed by organizations that are as specialized as 
the Association of Pensioners of the Republic of Srpska.35 
Many times, several NGOs participated in filing the same report, or in 
filing several reports regarding the same judgment. While many judgments 
drew reports from a single NGO,36 in one instance as many as fifty-five 
NGOs were involved in filing reports regarding a single judgment.37 
II. WHICH TYPES OF JUDGMENTS ATTRACT THE MOST NGO 
ATTENTION? 
The reputation of states reflects the beliefs of the international 
community about their practices. These beliefs evolve based on accusations 
targeting the states by foreign governments, courts, and other actors such as 
NGOs. The DEJ website is only one arena where states are publicly shamed 
for their practices. Nevertheless, much can be learned about the incentives 
and strategy of NGOs from how they use this arena. The strategy NGOs 
employ may carry through to other arenas as well, such as their own media 
publications and their discussions. 
In order to decipher how NGOs divide their attention, two methods of 
analyzing the relevant data are used. The first method compares the 137 
cases that led to NGO reports to the “general population” of cases—a sample 
 
 32. COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, APPENDIX 4: RULES OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS FOR THE 
SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS AND OF THE TERMS OF FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT, RULE 
9.2 (2006). 
 33. Lucja Miara & Victoria Prais, supra note 29, at 534, 536. 
 34. For further analysis, see infra Part II.A. 
 35. See Karanovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 39462/03, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Fourth 
Section), not reported. 
 36. For additional detail, see infra Part II. 
 37. Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 40984/07, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. (First Section) (unpublished). 
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consisting of all the Chamber and Grand Chamber Judgments38 issued in 
English39 from January 1, 200840 to October 31, 201341 in which the ECHR 
found at least one violation and which are not part of the group of cases that 
led to NGO reports. In this sample, the court found 7,847 violations42 in a 
total of 5,584 judgments. Comparing the judgments that led to NGO reports 
with the judgments from the general population will help determine if NGOs 
tend to file reports especially on issues of a certain type. 
The second method sorts cases that led to NGO reports according to the 
amount of attention they received. This method relies on three proxies for 
special NGO attention: the number of reports filed,43 the number of NGOs 
 
 38. The first method employed involved a comparison between the number of cases that did lead to 
NGO reports and the number of cases that did not lead to NGO reports. The latter number is the total 
sample size of cases described less the cases that led to NGO reports. Only one (0.73%) of the cases that 
led to NGO reports was issued by a court committee. Since committee judgments typically accompany 
more technical cases that have become common only in recent years due to structural changes initiated 
by Protocol 14, they were excluded from the group. 
 39. While some judgments do not have a full English language version on HUDOC, all judgments 
have their case details coded in English as well. These details appear when English documents are 
searched, assuring that all the judgments issued by the ECHR at this period are represented in the sample. 
 40. Of the 137 cases that led to NGO reports, only thirty-four judgments became final (Grand 
Chamber judgments are final immediately, Chamber judgments become final three months after they are 
issued if no referral to the Grand Chamber was requested; see art. 44 to the Convention) before Jan. 1, 
2008, with the earliest becoming final on Oct. 30, 1998. The Oct. 30, 1998 judgment is the only judgment 
that became final before Protocol 11 came into force on Nov. 1, 1998. Only nine cases became final 
before Jan. 1, 2005. Although the number of applications filed per year increased rapidly between Nov. 
1998 and 2008, there was no procedural change in the court at this period and no reason to believe that 
older judgments, especially the judgments issued only a couple of years before 2008, differ systematically 
from judgments in the general population. 
 41. All 137 cases that led to NGO reports became final before Oct. 31, 2013. The most recent case 
became final on Oct. 21, 2013. 
 42. According to a HUDOC coding of violations of articles mentioned in Table 1 of this Article. 
Many judgments contain more than one violation. In my data and in the HUDOC database, several 
violations of the same article in the same judgment are counted as one violation. 
 43. There are large differences in the amount of attention NGOs devoted to judgments, even when 
they did file a report: 67.15% of the judgments that led to NGO reports led to only 1 NGO report; 24.82% 
led to 2-4 NGO reports; 5.11% led to 5-10 NGO reports; and only 2.92% led to 11 or more NGO reports. 
Some reports involved several NGOs and often the same NGO submitted many reports. In total, 92 of the 
judgments led to only 1 NGO report, 34 judgments led to 2-4 NGO reports, 7 judgments led to 5-10 NGO 
reports, and 4 judgments led to 11 or more NGO reports. A few unique cases attracted the extreme 
attention of NGOs. For example, D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00, is the only 
case issued against the Czech Republic that led to NGO reports and yet it attracted no less than seventeen 
reports involving ten different NGOs. The case also attracted a report by the Public Defender of Rights—
a national human rights institution. Just as unique is the fact that nine NGOs participated as third parties 
in the application itself, yet none of them are included in the group of NGOs that filed a report later on. 
In addition, sometimes one NGO report addresses several judgments. To make the coding consistent, 
only judgments mentioned in the formal title page of the report were coded. Usually the title page covers 
all judgments actually addressed by the report, but in rare cases (for example, Report (2011)250 filed 
against Bulgaria) the report itself mentions other judgments likely considered less important or less 
relevant by the DEJ. 
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involved,44 and the number of pages contained in all NGO reports.45 The 
Article compares the fifty-four cases that led to “minimal” NGO attention—
only one report, filed by only one NGO, and holding no more than ten 
pages—with the thirty-eight cases that drew “special” NGO attention—two 
or more reports, filed by two or more NGOs, and holding at least eleven 
pages. This comparison can reveal what issues NGOs focus on. 
A. The Severity of the Violation 
1. The Violated Right 
One proxy for the severity of the violation is the type of right that was 
infringed. Comparing the types of rights that were infringed in the general 
population of cases and in the cases that led to NGO reports will reveal 
whether NGOs submit reports on compliance with cases that found severe 
violations or minor violations. 
Table 1 shows the percentage of violations (the number of violations 
found divided by the number of judgments) in the general population of 
judgments and in the judgments that led to NGO reports. 
 
Table 1: The Severity of Violations in the General Population and in 
Cases that Led to NGO Reports  
Judgments In 
the General 
Population  
Judgments Leading to 
NGO Reports 
Article 2 - right to life 6.64% 13.14% 
Article 3 - prohibition of torture 18.48% 27.74% 
Article 4 - prohibition of slavery and 
forced labor 
0.05% 0.73% 
Article 5 - right to liberty and security 17.37% 13.87% 
 
 44. The number of NGOs involved in applications regarding a specific case also varies greatly: 
60.58% of the judgments led to applications involving only 1 NGO; 27.01% led to 2-3 NGOs involved; 
6.57% led to 4-6 NGOs involved; 5.11% led to 7-10 NGOs involved; and another 0.73% led to 11 or 
more NGOs involved. In total, 83 judgments led to applications involving only 1 NGO, 37 judgments led 
to 2-3 NGOs involved, 9 judgments led to 4-6 NGOs involved, and 7 judgments led to 7-10 NGOs 
involved. Only 1 judgment led to 11 or more NGOs involved. 
 45. There are also great differences in the length of the NGO reports submitted. Often NGOs attach 
appendices to their reports including detailed factual backgrounds. Reports range from short letters to 
detailed documents totaling dozens of pages: 4.38% of the judgments led to NGO reports totaling 3 pages 
or less; 43.07% led to reports totaling between 4 and 10 pages; 17.52% led to reports totaling between 11 
and 20 pages; 21.17% led to reports between 21 and 50 pages; and 13.87% led to reports as long or longer 
than 51 pages (all figures include the introduction page attached by the Department of Enforcement of 
Judgments and the response of the state, if there was one). In total, 6 judgments led to NGO reports 
totaling 3 pages or less; 59 judgments led to reports totaling between 4 and 10 pages; 24 judgments led 
to reports totaling between 11 and 20 pages; 29 judgments led to reports between 21 and 50 pages in 
length; and 19 judgments led to reports as long or longer than 51 pages. 
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Article 6 - right to a fair trial 54.15% 27.74% 
Article 7 - no punishment without law 0.39% 0.73% 
Article 8 - right to respect for private 
and family life 
8.72% 16.06% 
Article 9 - freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion 
0.56% 6.57% 
Article 10 - freedom of expression 4.14% 7.30% 
Article 11 - freedom of assembly and 
association 
1.34% 7.30% 
Article 12 - right to marry 0.07% 0% 
Article 13 - right to an effective 
remedy 
12.23% 20.44% 
Article 14 - prohibition of 
discrimination 
2.01% 13.14% 
Protocol 1 Article 1 - protection of 
property 
13.75% 11.68% 
Protocol 1 Article 2 - right to education  0.11% 5.84% 
Protocol 1 Article 3 - right to free 
elections 
0.14% 4.38% 
Protocol 4 - additional freedoms (of 
movements, aliens, etc.) 
0.18% 2.19% 
Protocol 6 - abolition of the death 
penalty 
0% 0% 
Protocol 7 - additional rights (for 
appeals, aliens, etc.) 
0.18% 2.19% 
Protocol 12 - general right to equality 0% 0.73% 
Protocol 13 - complete abolition of the 
death penalty 
0% 0% 
Total Percentages 
 
140.51% 
 
181.77% 
 
Table 1 highlights several striking differences. Some of these 
differences (bolded) may reveal that NGOs tend to focus on violations of 
special severity according to the Convention article involved. A Two-Tailed 
Fisher’s Exact Test was used to establish the statistical significance of these 
differences. The same test was used throughout this Article.46 Most 
importantly, there are more violations of Article 2 protecting the right to life 
in the group of cases that led to NGO reports than in the general population 
(13.14% as opposed to 6.64%).47 Table 1 also shows more violations of 
Article 3’s prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment in the group of 
judgments that led to NGO reports than in the general population (27.74% 
 
 46. The Two-Tailed Fisher’s Exact Test for establishing statistical significance is especially useful 
with small sample sizes and can calculate exact P values. The results throughout this Article were checked 
by the author using GraphPad software available at http://graphpad.com/quickcalcs/contingency1.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/6WQU-JSBU] (data on file with author). 
 47. P value of 0.0056 (indicating a statistically significant difference). 
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as opposed to 18.48%).48 These differences are statistically significant. 
Violations of Articles 2 and 3 are generally considered the most severe 
violations under the ECHR’s jurisdiction, and states cannot derogate from 
these Articles, even in times of emergency.49 
Furthermore, there are more violations of Article 13 that concern failing 
to supply victims with an effective remedy in the group of cases that led to 
NGO reports than in the general population of judgments (20.44% as 
opposed to 12.23%).50 An even greater difference between the two groups 
concerns violations of Article 14 requiring states to give equal treatment 
(13.14% as opposed to 2.01%).51 These differences are also statistically 
significant. Applicants often accuse states of violating their rights under 
Articles 13 or 14 in addition to the main violation covered by another article 
of the Convention. Usually, the ECHR decides that finding an additional 
violation besides the main violated article is unnecessary. But in rare cases 
when the discrimination of the applicants is severe or when the state doesn’t 
provide any good remedy, the ECHR finds a violation of these articles as 
well. Accordingly, the existence of Article 13 and Article 14 violations can 
serve as a good proxy for the existence of severe and pervasive human rights 
violations. 
The first method of analyzing the data finds significant differences 
supporting the conclusion that NGOs usually file reports on more severe 
cases. These are either cases that deal with the most severe types of human 
rights violations or cases that reveal additional problems, such as 
discrimination or a lack of an effective remedy for the violation. The second 
method of analysis can also be used here. However, the data about NGO 
attention in cases in which at least one NGO report was filed isn’t conclusive 
regarding some of the articles examined. It only suggests that NGOs focus 
special attention on violations that are severe due to the discrimination they 
entail between social groups, and therefore involve an Article 14 violation.52 
 
 48. P value of 0.0102 (indicating a statistically significant difference). 
 49. See The Convention, supra note 8 at art. 15(2); see also Natasa Mavronicola, What is an Abso-
lute Right? Deciphering Absoluteness in the Context of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 12 HUM. RTS L. REV. 723, 757 (2012) (arguing that Article 3 protects an absolute right that states 
cannot digress from regardless of the implications). 
 50. P value of 0.0081 (indicating a statistically significant difference). 
 51. P value of less than 0.0001 (indicating a statistically significant difference). 
 52. Cases that drew minimal NGO attention included 18.52% of Article 2 violations, 24.07% of 
Article 3 violations, 18.52% of Article 13 violations, and 5.56% of Article 14 violations. Cases that drew 
special NGO attention included 10.53% of Article 2 violations, 34.21% of Article 3 violations, 28.95% 
of Article 13 violations, and 26.32% of Article 14 violations. Unexpectedly, therefore, there are more 
Article 2 violations in cases that drew minimal NGO attention than in cases that drew special NGO 
attention. Yet this difference is not statistically significant (P value of 0.3828). Although there seem to 
be more Article 3 and Article 13 violations in cases that drew special NGO attention, the differences 
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2. Just Satisfaction 
Another proxy for the severity of the violation is the “just satisfaction” 
granted by the court. Just satisfaction compensates the applicant only for 
harms that will not be redressed by compliance with the court’s decree. As a 
result, it is not a perfect proxy for the severity of the violation. Some 
violations may be very severe and lead to great harm if continued, such as 
an unjustified arrest, but will lead to small amounts of compensation for 
damage already incurred. In other cases, the ECHR may address violations 
involving economic issues that do not raise acute human rights concerns but 
nonetheless lead to high sums of compensation. With these caveats in mind, 
it may be useful to consider just satisfaction as a rough proxy for the severity 
of violations. This raises the question: which types of cases do NGOs focus 
on, as illustrated by the amounts granted by the ECHR in just satisfaction?  
Comparing cases that led to minimal and to special NGO attention can 
provide meaningful insight. Table 2 presents this data together with the 
figures for the entire group of cases that led to NGO reports.53 
 
Table 2: Amounts of Just Satisfaction in Judgments that Led to Special 
NGO Attention 
Sum of Just Satisfaction 
(in Euros)  
All Cases Leading 
to NGO Reports 
Minimal NGO 
Attention   
Special NGO 
Attention  
None 13.87% 9.26% 10.53% 
Less than 1,000 3.65% 3.70% 5.26% 
1,000-10,000 35.04% 38.89% 13.16% 
10,001-100,000 35.77% 35.19% 50.00% 
More than 100,000 11.68% 12.96% 21.05% 
In cases with more than 10,000 Euros in just satisfaction, there is a 
tendency for those cases with special NGO attention to involve higher just 
satisfaction than cases with minimal NGO attention. This difference is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.54 
 
concerning these articles are not statistically significant (P values of 0.3495 and 0.3142, respectively). In 
contrast, the difference regarding Article 14, which is more common in cases of special NGO attention, 
is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (P value of 0.0066). 
 53. For an analysis of the harms compensated for by just satisfaction, see OCTAVIAN ICHIM, JUST 
SATISFACTION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 98–121 (2015). The court has 
especially wide discretion in determining non-pecuniary damages. Id. at 121. To provide a sense of the 
amount of just satisfaction typically granted by the ECHR,  the median sum awarded for the most severe 
violation, violation of the right to life under Article 2, is around 20,000-30,000 Euros. See id. at 128. 
Compensation for inappropriate detention conditions is often less than 10,000 Euros. Id. at 129. 
 54. P value of 0.0338. However, comparing the relative part of cases with more than 100,000 Euros 
just satisfaction in cases that led to minimal and to special NGO attention does not yield statistically 
significant results (P value of 0.3922). 
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The analysis so far supports the view that reputational sanctions are not 
merely a source of annoyance, but rather focus on issues of real concern. Yet 
the question remains whether the cases that draw the attention of NGOs are 
also cases of greater legal importance. 
B. The Legal Importance of the Case 
Cases involving severe violations are not necessarily legally important. 
A case could address the most terrible human rights violations and at the 
same time involve no novel legal argument. In fact, important cases can 
address relatively mild human rights violations. For example, the ECHR’s 
Von Hannover case55 that addressed the permissibility of publishing 
paparazzi pictures of the princess of Monaco is a very important case because 
of its innovative legal analysis of the proper balance between privacy and 
freedom of the press. However, the violation this case addresses isn’t severe 
compared to the cases the ECHR regularly handles. 
Establishing the legal importance of a case seems like a tricky task—
one that requires great doctrinal skill and legal understanding. Fortunately, 
there are many good proxies for the importance of cases, some of which are 
addressed in this sub-part. 
1. HUDOC Categorization 
The HUDOC database divides cases into four levels according to their 
importance: Case Reports, and Importance Levels 1, 2, and 3. Case Reports 
cases are selected for official publication. They are usually the most 
important cases in terms of their legal significance. Level 1 cases are 
unpublished cases that contributed significantly to the development, 
modification, or clarification of the ECHR’s case law. Level 2 cases are of 
medium importance; they do not make a significant contribution, but go 
somewhat beyond mere application of existing case law. Level 3 cases are 
cases of low importance; they merely apply case law and do not change it.56 
Cases that led to NGO reports are more likely to be categorized as either 
Case Reports57 or as Level 1 cases.58 While most of the cases the ECHR 
decides are in the Level 3 category of importance—merely applying the 
law—more than half of the cases that led to NGO reports are published or 
 
 55. See generally Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
 56. See EUR. CT. OF H.R., HUDOC  USER MANUAL 11–12 (2012), http://www.echr.coe.int/Docume 
nts/HUDOC_Manual_2012_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YA4-792D]. 
 57. P value of less than 0.0001 (indicating a statistically significant difference). 
 58. P value of  less than 0.0001 (indicating a statistically significant difference). The cases that led 
to NGO reports are obviously even more likely to be categorized in these two categories (case reports 
and Importance Level 1) taken together (statistically significant difference, P value of less than 0.0001) 
than cases in the general population. 
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contribute significantly to the court’s case law and are therefore classified in 
the Case Reports or Level 1 categories.59 
The data also suggest that cases that draw special NGO attention are 
usually more important than cases that draw minimal NGO attention—they 
are significantly more likely to be categorized as Case Reports60 or Level 1 
cases61—indicating that NGOs focus more attention on important cases.62 
2. The Size of the Panel 
Given that only cases of extreme legal importance are decided by the 
Grand Chamber,63 another method of measuring a case’s importance is to 
check if the case was decided by a Chamber or by a Grand Chamber. In the 
general population, only 0.81% of the cases were Grand Chamber judgments 
while 99.19% were Chamber judgments.64 Contrast that with the cases that 
led to NGO reports. There are 137 cases in the group. Only one of them was 
issued by a Committee of three judges and was excluded from the analysis.65 
Excluding this case, the group included 15.33% (21) Grand Chamber 
judgments66 and 83.94% (115) Chamber judgments. The difference between 
the groups is statistically significant.67 This supports the conclusion that a far 
greater proportion of the cases that led to NGO reports involved questions of 
 
 59. The importance levels of cases in the general population were divided as follows: Case Reports 
(1.56%); Importance Level 1 (2.70%); Importance Level 2 (17.25%); and Importance Level 3 (78.49%). 
From 5,584 cases in the general population, the cases divided as follows: 87 Case Reports; 151 
Importance Level 1 cases; 963 Importance Level 2 cases; and 4,383 Importance Level 3 cases). Contrast 
that with the distribution of the cases that led to NGO reports: Case Reports (31.39%); Importance Level 
1 cases (18.98%); Importance Level 2 cases (35.04%); and Importance Level 3 cases (14.60%). Those 
percentages represent, from a total of 137 cases that led to NGO reports, 43 Case Reports; 26 Importance 
Level 1 cases; 48 Importance Level 2 cases; and 20 Importance Level 3 cases. The differences are clear. 
 60. P value of 0.0008. 
 61. P value of 0.0124. The difference between the proportions of cases in these two categories 
combined has a P value of less than 0.0001. 
 62. Cases that drew minimal NGO attention were distributed as follows: Case Reports 18.52%; 
Importance Level 1 cases (9.26%); Importance Level 2 cases (44.44%); and Importance Level 3 cases 
(27.78%). Cases that drew special NGO attention were distributed as follows: Case Reports (52.63%); 
Importance Level 1 cases (31.58%); Importance Level 2 cases (15.79%); and Importance Level 3 cases 
(0%). 
 63. See commentary, supra note 17. 
 64. From 5,584 cases in the general population, 45 are Grand Chamber judgments and 5,539 are 
Chamber judgments. 
 65. All such cases are deliberately not part of the general population to exclude technical cases 
issued after Protocol 14 went into force. 
 66. Of these cases, eleven were decided only by a Grand Chamber based on a referral by the 
Chamber and ten cases were decided by the Grand Chamber after a previous Chamber decision and a 
request by the parties. 
 67. P value of less than 0.0001. 
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great legal significance that were discussed by the Grand Chamber, 
compared to the rest of the cases issued by the ECHR. 
Similarly, there is a significantly greater proportion of Grand Chamber 
cases in the group of cases that led to special NGO attention as compared to 
cases that led to minimal NGO attention.68 This suggests that NGOs focus 
their attention on cases of greater legal importance, which are more likely to 
be decided by the Grand Chamber. 
3. Judicial Dialogue 
Another proxy for a case’s legal importance is the level of dialogue 
among judges. Most judgments of the ECHR are issued unanimously. But 
sometimes judges dissent or write concurring opinions. These cases are 
usually more legally significant; otherwise, the judges would not be in 
dispute or at least would not dedicate the time necessary to write a separate 
opinion. In the general population, only 10.89% of the judgments contained 
at least one separate opinion. In contrast, 35.77% of the judgments that led 
to NGO reports contained at least one separate opinion.69 This difference is 
statistically significant.70 
In cases that led to minimal NGO attention, 24.07% contained at least 
one separate opinion. In cases that attracted special NGO attention, 57.89% 
contained at least one separate opinion. This difference is also statistically 
significant.71 These results suggest that NGOs focus their attention on issues 
of special legal significance, where judges are usually more inclined to 
present their views by way of a separate opinion. 
4. Other Proxies for Salience 
After judgments are issued by the ECHR, the CM categorizes them in 
a way that will aid the monitoring of compliance. In 2012, from the 11,099 
cases pending before the CM, only 1,431 (12.9%) were Leading Cases—
 
 68. Cases that led to minimal NGO attention were divided as follows: 1.85% (one judgment) issued 
by a committee (which was thus excluded from the analysis); 9.26% involved Grand Chamber judgments; 
and 88.89% involved Chamber judgments. In contrast, cases that led to special NGO attention were 
divided as follows: 36.84% involved Grand Chamber judgments and 63.16% involved Chamber 
judgments. The difference between the groups is statistically significant (P value of 0.0032). As noted 
above, the significance test excludes the case involving a judgement issued by a committee. 
 69. Of the 5584 judgments in the general population, 608 contained a separate opinion. Of the 137 
judgments that led to NGO reports, 49 contained at least one separate opinion. Many of the judgments 
with NGO reports attracted a significant number of separate opinions: 10.22% of the judgments attracted 
three or more dissenting judges, while 5.11% attracted three or more concurring judges. 
 70. P value of less than 0.0001. 
 71. P value of 0.0020. 
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namely, cases which raise so-called “general structural problems.”72 Contrast 
that with the data on judgments that drew NGO reports: 91 (76.47%) of the 
119 judgments that were still pending on January 2015 were categorized as 
Leading Cases. This difference is statistically significant,73 but it is important 
to note that the CM may tend to categorize cases as Leading Cases because 
they drew NGO attention, which suggests a potential problem of reversed 
causality.74 Of the cases that led to minimal NGO attention, 57.45% were 
Leading Cases. Of cases that led to special NGO attention, 91.18% were 
Leading Cases. This difference is statistically significant.75 
It may be useful to compare judgments that drew minimal NGO 
attention to judgments that drew special NGO attention according to their 
propensity to lead to interim resolutions by the CM. Interim resolutions are 
the primary way for the CM to direct reputational sanctions against 
recalcitrant states. It is reasonable to assume that this tool is reserved for 
issues that are of the highest concern to the CM; therefore, if cases with 
interim resolutions draw increased NGO attention, this may suggest that 
NGOs focus on severe violations. Only 7.41% of the cases that drew minimal 
NGO attention led to one interim resolution. None of the cases in this group 
led to more than one interim resolution. In contrast, in cases that led to 
special NGO attention, 10.53% led to one interim resolution, 7.89% led to 
two interim resolutions, and 5.26% led to three interim resolutions. If the 
propensity to generate at least one interim resolution is compared within the 
two groups, the difference between them is statistically significant.76 This 
understates the difference, of course, as the data reveals that only issues with 
special NGO attention sometimes led to more than one interim resolution. 
Despite the apparent difference, it is important to caution that the CM may 
decide to issue interim resolutions based on the shaming efforts of NGOs or 
 
 72. In 2011 this figure is roughly the same—from 10,689 cases pending there were 1,337 (12.51%) 
Leading Cases. 
 73. P value of less than 0.0001. This significance test is unique: It does not refer to the general 
population of judgments referred to throughout this Article but instead to cases categorized by the CM as 
explained above. Furthermore, because of the very large sample, a different statistical test was used this 
time—Chi-square with Yates correction. In this case, Chi squared equals 400.429 with one degree of 
freedom. 
 74. Some of the cases that led to NGO reports were closed by the CM and are therefore not 
categorized either as a Leading Case or not. An additional 20.17% of the cases that led to NGO reports 
were grouped with another Leading Case; in this group of cases, though the case may not be the prime 
representative of the structural problem, it is related to a problem that led to another Leading Case. 
 75. P value of 0.0010. Seven judgments that led to NGO reports (5.11%) are Pilot Cases. Five of 
them are cases with special NGO attention, and none of them is a case with minimal NGO attention. 
These cases not only involve a structural problem—the problem is so severe or widespread that the court 
issued a specific decree detailing how the state should act to remedy it. This novel procedure has only 
been used in a handful of cases in the court’s history. 
 76. P value of 0.0355. 
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on the behavior of the state itself, which could, in turn, also be affected by 
NGO reports. In fact, several NGO activists insisted in interviews that the 
CM issued an interim resolution because of the reports they filed and the 
pressure they exerted on it to monitor state compliance.77 Therefore, causal 
connections here are murky.78 
C. Conclusions on the Focus of NGO Attention 
The preceding sub-parts provide evidence that NGOs focus their efforts 
on cases that expose severe violations and that are legally important. This 
supports the view that reputational sanctions are meaningful. The agents 
imposing these sanctions by shaming wrongdoers do not focus on trivial 
matters. They are concerned with important issues of human rights. 
III. WHICH TYPE OF STATES DRAW THE MOST NGO 
ATTENTION? 
Are reputational sanctions targeted primarily against states that 
typically fail to comply with human rights norms, so-called “low-reputation 
states”? Or, do sanctions target states with a reputation for enforcing human 
rights standards, so called “high-reputation states”? A finding that for every 
case issued against a high-reputation state there is a greater chance that 
NGOs will file reports than for a case issued against a low-reputation state 
would support the hypothesis that reputational sanctions focus primarily on 
states with a high reputation.79 
A. Measuring States’ Reputation 
Before addressing the question of which states are usually targeted by 
reputational sanctions, it is first necessary to categorize states according to 
 
 77. This information (and all other interview-related information in this article) is derived from 
interviews conducted by the author. The author agreed not to mention interviewees by name and that 
transcripts of the interviews will not be circulated. As such, any and all assertions remain unverified by 
the editor. Skype Interview: NGO activist 8, (May 20, 2015); Skype Interview: Official at the Russian 
Justice Initiative (June 1, 2015). 
 78. Another method to check the concern of the CM is the decision to direct a case to the enhanced 
supervision track instead of the standard supervision track. Only cases that require greater monitoring 
attention or urgent action, or that involve serious structural problems, are reviewed under enhanced 
supervision. Of the forty-seven cases with minimal NGO attention that were still pending on January 
2015, thirty-three (70.21%) are under enhanced supervision. Of the thirty-four cases with special NGO 
attention still pending at the time, twenty-five (73.53%) are under enhanced supervision. This difference 
is not statistically significant (P value of 0.8066). 
 79. If all reports are focused on low-reputation states, this would imply that they are the most 
vulnerable to such accusations. If many but not all reports are focused on low-reputation states, this does 
not necessarily imply that high-reputation states are immune from reputational sanctions; after all, low-
reputation states are responsible for an immense majority of the violations. 
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their levels of reputation. But any such attempt is subject to accusations of 
bias. Many people probably have some intuitions about which countries 
abide by international law and which ignore it most of the time. But these 
intuitions can be wrong. They could result from stereotypes rather than from 
real data. In contrast, information about a state’s level of democracy,80 
freedom,81 or corruption82 may be quite accurate, but it may have little to do 
with the state’s propensity to comply with international law. 
To measure the actual tendency of states to comply with the ECHR—
as a useful substitute for the elusive perceptions of the international 
community about these states’ behavior that really constitute their 
reputation—this Article constructs a new metric.83 This metric is developed 
by gathering data on six different facts relating to states: 
1. The number of pending cases allocated to a judicial formation 
on December 31, 2012.84 
2. The number of judgments finding at least one violation in 
2012.85 
3. The number of judgments finding at least one violation between 
1959 and 2012.86 
4. The number of cases pending at the CM (supervising 
compliance) in 2012.87 
5. The number of Leading Cases pending at the CM in 2012.88 
 
 80. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY RANKING, http://democracyranking.org/ (an example of an organization 
that provides an annual ranking of all country-based democracies. This organization tests the strength of 
each country’s democracy based on one political dimension and five non-political dimensions: (1) gender 
(socio-economic and educational gender equality); (2) economy (economic system); (3) knowledge 
(knowledge-based information society, research and education); (4) health (health status and health 
system); and (5) environment (environmental sustainability). 
 81. See FREEDOM HOUSE, https://www.freedomhouse.org/ (independent watchdog agency that 
publishes analysis of the state of political liberties and civil rights in nations across the world). 
 82. See Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.transparen 
cy.org/country (organization that investigates corruption in countries around the world and publishes an 
annual Corruption Perceptions Index). 
 83. Part V investigates reasons why the beliefs held by the international community about states’ 
behavior may be wrong or systematically biased. Despite these potential risks, which Part V argues are 
somewhat alleviated by the nature of the human rights community, the actual behavior of the state remains 
the best possible proxy for its reputation. 
 84. Data from EUR. CT. H.R, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, 150 (2013), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documen 
ts/Annual_report_2012_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R4C-M5FF]. 
 85. Id. at 154–55. 
 86. Id. at 158–59. 
 87. COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF 
JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS – 6TH ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS 2012, 45–47 (2013), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchSer 
vices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680592ac8 [https://perma.cc/UA9F-7S5X]. 
 88. Id. 
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6. The number of pending cases awaiting confirmation of 
payment of just satisfaction at the end of 2012.89 
All of these indicators aim to address the states’ human rights practices 
that are detected by the international community and thus translate into the 
states’ reputation. Each indicator is designed to counter the biases of the 
other measures. The number of judgments that find violations seems like a 
good measure of compliance with the Convention, but it is exposed to the 
accusation that the court itself is biased in favor of some states and against 
others and is consequently likely to find certain states in violation more 
often.90 The number of cases filed against states may counter this potential 
bias, yet it is possible that applicants target more cases against states that are 
disfavored by the ECHR, thereby improving their chances of victory. 
Finally, the last three measures aim to assess the compliance of states with 
the ECHR’s judgments themselves, rather than compliance with the 
Convention. The number of cases as well as the number of Leading Cases 
awaiting compliance at the CM are both relevant measures, as they address 
both the raw number of applications and a good proxy for the number of 
structural problems that led to Leading Cases. Non-payment of just 
satisfaction is an additional indicator of unwillingness to comply. 
All indicators are highly correlated with one another;91 suggesting that 
they all reveal the same quality: the general willingness of a given state to 
comply with international law. This quality is presumably perceived by the 
international community and forms the state’s reputation. 
For each indicator, the forty-seven countries comprising the Council of 
Europe were divided into five groups. The ten countries with the best 
practices are categorized as 1, the next ten as 2, etc. The last group—the 
states with the worst practices—includes only seven states. After states 
receive a number with respect to each metric, the six numbers are averaged 
and the result rounded to the nearest whole number to obtain the state’s final 
reputational score between 1 and 5—where 5 indicates the states with the 
worst reputations.92 This proxy of the state’s reputation may not be perfect, 
but it comes as close as possible to an objective measure of any given state’s 
willingness to comply with international law. 
 
 89. Id. at 57–59. 
 90. See generally Dothan, supra note 25 (arguing that the ECHR is more willing to find low-
reputation states in violation of the Convention compared to high-reputation states). 
 91. The CORREL function in Excel was used to calculate the correlation between the propensity of 
states to be in one of the groups (1–5) mentioned in the next paragraph, according to each one of the six 
indicators. The lowest correlation was between indicators 1 and 6 (66.8%). The average of the correlations 
between all possible pairs of indicators was 80.9%. 
 92. There are fewer states in the 5 group for each metric, making this score a potent signal of the 
state’s bad practices. 
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The information on states with reputation levels 1 and 2 can safely be 
disregarded. First, very few cases involving these states have been brought 
before the ECHR—less than 3% of the cases in the general population, as 
table 5 below shows. This provides no real opportunity to file NGO reports; 
indeed only one case that led to NGO reports involved a state of reputation 
level 2, and no such case involved a state of reputation level 1. Second, the 
populations of the countries with reputation levels 1 and 2 are very small. 
Some of these countries can be credited with a high reputation level because 
they usually comply with their Convention obligations, but many just have a 
miniscule citizenry and fewer occasions for violations.93 
Excluding countries with reputation levels 1 and 2 from the analysis 
leaves only the comparison between eight states with reputation level 5, 
which can be called “low-reputation states,” and twenty-three states with 
reputation levels 3 and 4, which can be called “high-reputation states.” 
This empirical metric is consistent with long-held views about the 
nature of states in Europe. It is telling that Russia, Poland, Turkey, and 
Romania which were nicknamed the “Big Four”—because they are known 
for being responsible for the most cases before the ECHR94—are all coded 
as low-reputation states. Most of the other results of this metric sit well with 
intuition and with less systematic methods to address the behavior of states 
in Europe.95 
B. The Connection Between State Reputation and NGO Applications 
A quick glance at the states that led to NGO reports appears to support 
the hypothesis that NGOs focus on low-reputation states. Countries with low 
reputations are indeed targeted by most of the NGO reports filed. However, 
these countries are also responsible for most of the judgments that the ECHR 
has issued. Table 3 summarizes data on the number of judgments against 
different types of states and the corresponding number of judgments against 
them that led to reports. 
 
 
 93. Of the sixteen countries in reputation levels 1 and 2, six have a population smaller than half a 
million. The country with the smallest population is San Marino, with just 32,000 citizens. The average 
population of all states in levels 1 and 2 is 3,354,125 and their combined population is just 53,666,000—
smaller than the population of Germany or the United Kingdom, which both have a reputation level of 3. 
Population Figures by Country, ONE WORLD NATIONS ONLINE, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/ 
population-by-country.htm [https://perma.cc/H6S2-79WW]. 
 94. See Luzius Wildhaber, The European Court of Human Rights: The Past, The Present, The 
Future, 22 AMER. U. INT’L L. REV. 521, 527 (2007). 
 95. See SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS: A THEORY OF NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 239–42 (2015) (analyzing data about the human rights compliance of states in 
Europe without developing a systematic metric of states reputation). 
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Table 3: The States, Their Reputations, the Judgments Issued Against 
Them and the Judgments that Led to Reports 
Reputation 
Level State 
Number of 
Judgments 
– General 
Population  
Percentage 
of  
Judgments 
– General 
Population  
Number of 
Judgments 
with NGO 
Reports 
Percentage 
of  
Judgments 
with NGO 
Reports  
3 Albania 23 0.41% 1 0.73% 
1 Andorra 2 0.04% 0 0 
3 Armenia 25 0.45% 9 6.57% 
3 Austria 57 1.02% 0 0 
4 Azerbaijan 37 0.66% 13 9.49% 
3 Belgium 40 0.72% 1 0.73% 
3 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 19 0.34% 2 1.46% 
5 Bulgaria 247 4.42% 8 5.84% 
4 Croatia 90 1.61% 4 2.92% 
2 Cyprus 14 0.25% 0 0 
4 
Czech 
Republic  55 0.98% 1 0.73% 
1 Denmark 6 0.11% 0 0 
2 Estonia 15 0.27% 0 0 
3 Finland 57 1.02% 0 0 
4 France 126 2.26% 5 3.65% 
3 Georgia  28 0.50% 4 2.92% 
3 Germany 66 1.18% 0 0 
5 Greece 241 4.32% 3 2.19% 
4 Hungary 123 2.20% 1 0.73% 
1 Iceland 3 0.05% 0 0 
2 Ireland 2 0.04% 1 0.73% 
5 Italy  229 4.10% 3 2.19% 
3 Latvia 38 0.68% 1 0.73% 
1 Liechtenstein 0 0.00% 0 0 
3 Lithuania  37 0.66% 1 0.73% 
1 Luxembourg 13 0.23% 0 0 
2 Malta 22 0.39% 0 0 
4 
Republic of 
Moldova 123 2.20% 3 2.19% 
1 Monaco 2 0.04% 0 0 
2 Montenegro 14 0.25% 0 0 
2 Netherlands 11 0.20% 0 0 
1 Norway 8 0.14% 0 0 
5 Poland 395 7.07% 21 15.31% 
4 Portugal 58 1.04% 0 0 
5 Romania 584 10.46% 5 3.65% 
5 
Russian 
Federation 899 16.10% 23 16.79% 
1 San Marino 1 0.02% 0 0 
4 Serbia 51 0.91% 3 2.19% 
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3 
Slovak 
Republic 109 1.95% 0 0 
4 Slovenia 50 0.90% 1 0.73% 
3 Spain 37 0.66% 2 1.46% 
2 Sweden 13 0.23% 0 0 
2 Switzerland 31 0.56% 0 0 
3 
The former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 61 1.09% 0 0 
5 Turkey 1046 18.73% 9 6.57% 
5 Ukraine 424 7.59% 3 2.19% 
3 
United 
Kingdom 73 1.31% 10 7.3% 
Total:  5605 100.38% 138
96 100.73% 
To provide a clearer view of the types of states that NGOs focus on, 
Table 4 groups states according to their levels of reputation. The table 
illustrates the proportion of judgments in the general population that are 
targeted at states of every reputation level, and the corresponding proportions 
in cases that led to NGO reports. 
 
Table 4: The Proportion of Judgments and the Judgments that Led to 
NGO reports Conditioned on the States’ Reputations 
State Average Level 
of Reputation 
Percentage of 
Judgments from 
General Population 
Percentage of 
Judgments that 
Led to NGO  
Reports 
Ratio of Judgments 
with Reports to 
Judgments in the 
General Population 
1 (Disregard) 0.63% 0%  
2 (Disregard) 2.18% 0.73%  
3 (High Reputation)  12.00% 22.63%97 1.89 
4 (High Reputation)  12.77% 22.63% 1.77 
5 (Low Reputation)  72.80% 54.73% 0.75 
Judgments that led to NGO reports are more likely to be issued against 
 
 96.  Seven reports concerned a single judgment—M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 
30696/09, EUR. CT. H.R. (2011). This case is coded here twice, once as a Greek case and once as a Belgian 
case. Besides the data in Tables 3 and 4, the case was coded as addressing only Greece, which is the more 
direct applicant. The applicant in this case is an asylum seeker. The court found that the conditions of his 
detention in a Greek holding center and living conditions in Greece violated Article 3 to the Convention. 
Belgium violated Article 3 by the act of transferring the applicant to Greece—certainly a more incidental 
violation. Furthermore, the case against Belgium, but not against Greece, was closed by the CM on 
December 4, 2014. CM/ResDH (2014)272. Judgments addressing more than one state are rare but 
sometimes exist. This explains why the number of judgments leading to NGO reports and the judgments 
in the general population of cases sum to more than 100%. 
 97.  Or 21.90% when M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece is coded as addressing Greece alone. See id. 
21.90% is the figure used for the significance test. This choice makes proving the hypothesis that high-
reputation states are subject to more judgments harder (and consequently its proof more convincing) 
because Belgium is a high-reputation state and Greece is a low-reputation state. 
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high-reputation states and not low-reputation states compared to judgments 
in the general population. In fact, only 24.77% of the judgments in the 
general population address high-reputation states, compared to 45.26% of 
the judgments in the group that led to NGO reports. This difference is 
statistically significant.98 This demonstrates that NGOs are more likely to 
direct their efforts toward cases issued against high-reputation states than 
against low-reputation states. 
It is now possible to check the amount of attention NGOs devote to 
cases conditioned on the state’s reputation. 
 
Table 5: The Attention NGOs Devote to Cases Conditioned on the 
States’ Reputation 
State Average Level 
of Reputation 
Percentage of 
Judgments that Led 
to Minimal NGO  
Attention 
Percentage of  
Judgments that 
Led to Special 
NGO  
Attention 
Ratio of Judgments 
with  
Special Attention 
to Judgments with 
Minimal  
Attention 
1 (Disregard) 0% 0%  
2 (Disregard) 0% 2.63%  
3 (High Reputation) 18.52% 26.32% 1.42 
4 (High Reputation)  25.93% 18.42% 0.71 
5 (Low Reputation ) 55.56% 52.63% 0.95 
When the likelihood of judgments that led to special NGO attention to 
be directed at high-reputation states and not low-reputation states is 
compared to the corresponding likelihood in judgments that led to minimal 
 
 98. P value of less than 0.0001 (comparing reputation levels 3 and 4 combined to reputation level 
5, and excluding reputation levels 1 and 2). This highly significant result occurs despite the fact that the 
test includes data from all the low-reputation states examined including Poland, a clear outlier. Poland is 
responsible for 7.07% of the judgments in the general population, but 15.31% of the judgments with NGO 
reports. Despite being a low-reputation state, it therefore shows a special propensity to attract NGO 
reports. This propensity, the reason Poland is such an outlier, may be that Poland showed remarkable 
willingness to cooperate with the CM—a factor which, as explained in the next sub-part, may 
independently explain the willingness of NGOs to file reports against a state. Out of the 21 judgments 
against Poland that led to reports, Poland responded to all NGO reports concerning a judgment in 71.43% 
of the cases and to some of the reports in an extra 4.76% of the judgments. This contrasts sharply with 
the corresponding figures in all the judgments that led to NGO reports: 37.96% and 11.68%. 4.76% of 
the judgments against Poland resulted in action reports filed within 6 months of the judgments becoming 
final and another 80.95% included action reports filed after that time. In all the judgments, the first figure 
is slightly higher, 13.14%, but the second is much lower—60.58%. Furthermore, 19.05% of the 
judgments against Poland were closed by the CM by January 2015, while in all the judgments that led to 
NGO reports the corresponding figure is 13.14%. Including Poland in the pool tilts the results against the 
hypothesis—towards greater perceived vulnerability of low-reputation states like Poland to NGO 
attention. That the results are still significant without excluding Poland testifies to their strength. 
As a further robustness check, another test was conducted, comparing the data on all non-reputation 
level 5 states  to the data on states with reputation level 5. The result remains statistically significant (P-
value of less than 0.0001). 
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NGO attention, no significant difference emerges.99 
C. Alternative Explanations For the Focus of NGOs on High-Reputation 
States 
This sub-part considers alternative explanations for NGOs’ greater 
likelihood to file reports against high-reputation states, apart from an 
inherent preference of NGOs for targeting this type of states. Excluding these 
potential explanations can help determine if NGOs usually target high-
reputation states beyond the unique framework of the DEJ website 
procedure. 
1. Willingness to Reply to NGO Reports 
States are allowed to formally respond to NGO reports. Their responses 
are attached to the report and published in the same file on the CM’s 
website.100 States often choose not to respond. A potential reason for the 
focus of NGOs on high-reputation states is that high-reputation states have 
functioning democratic institutions that are more likely to take NGO reports 
seriously and reply to them. If state institutions are likely to respond to NGO 
reports, this could supply motivation for NGO intervention, because this 
response creates an opportunity for the NGO to engage in a dialogue with 
state administrators and to shape their behavior.101 
A reply does not necessarily indicate that the state is willing to make 
sacrifices to clear its good name. A state may choose the easy course of 
replying to accusations that garnered attention instead of amending its ways 
for the future. Indeed, although some government responses try to refute the 
accusations lodged against the government by offering countering data, 
others are technical and easily performed. For example, when the Russian 
Federation was faced with a report accusing it of abducting a person and 
forcibly transferring him to Uzbekistan, all its representative wrote in 
response was that the relevant application “was forwarded to the competent 
state authorities. In order to verify the statements set out in the application 
 
 99. P value of 1.0000. 
 100. States sometimes file communications that refer and respond to NGO reports filed a long time 
before (see for example the communication of the Polish government filed on Oct. 6, 2014 in response to 
Report (2014)1055 filed on Aug. 22, 2014). For the sake of consistency, such responses were not coded. 
Only responses formally attached to a report, which—besides in a few very early cases—are joined in the 
same pdf file, were counted. 
 101. On the other hand, acting through the CM may be the only way to communicate and receive 
information from low-reputation countries like Russia, which is otherwise unlikely to collaborate with 
NGOs. This fact was stressed in an interview with an official at Russian Justice Initiative conducted on 
June 1, 2015. Even if low-reputation states reveal less information to the CM than do high-reputation 
states, NGOs may still attempt to draw low-reputation states to respond to the CM, because otherwise 
they would get no information at all. 
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the inquiry is currently in process. Further information will be promptly 
submitted when the relevant data is received.”102 Such evasive responses are 
easily produced and certainly do not prove that the state is willing to 
undertake costly measures to protect its reputation. 
Table 6 measures the tendency of states to respond to NGO reports 
issued against them conditioned on the states’ reputation. 
 
Table 6: States’ Responses to NGO Reports Conditioned on the States’ 
Reputation 
Reputation Level  Respond to 
All NGO 
Reports 
Respond to Some 
NGO Reports 
No Response to NGO 
Reports 
1 (Disregard)  0% 0% 0% 
2 (Disregard)  0% 0% 100.00% 
3 (High Reputation) 46.67% 20.00% 33.33% 
4 (High Reputation) 38.71% 9.68% 51.61% 
5 (Low Reputation) 34.67% 9.33% 56.00% 
When the tendency of high-reputation states to respond to at least some 
of the NGO reports filed against them in a specific case is compared to the 
corresponding tendency in low-reputation states, the difference is not 
statistically significant.103 Similarly, when the tendency of high-reputation 
states to respond to all reports filed against them in a specific case is 
compared to the corresponding tendency of low-reputation states, the 
difference is also not statistically significant.104 The data do not suggest any 
reason to believe that NGOs focus their efforts on high-reputation states 
because they are more likely to reply to their accusations than are low-
reputation states. 
2. Willingness to Cooperate with the Committee of Ministers 
States may differ in their willingness to cooperate with the CM by filing 
action plans—a plan for how they are about to comply with the judgments 
issued against them—or action reports: a report of the measures already 
taken to comply. States can demonstrate special willingness to cooperate by 
filing this plan on time, within six months after a judgment becomes final.105 
As argued in the last sub-part, differences in states’ willingness to file action 
reports raise the possibility that NGOs may prefer to intervene in cases 
 
 102. NGO Report (2013)720. 
 103. P value of 0.1676. 
 104. P value of 0.3781. 
 105. Miara & Prais, supra note 29, at 531. The terms “action plan” and “action report” are used 
interchangeably here—they both describe documents submitted by states to explain how they are 
complying or how they will comply with the judgments against them. 
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against states that cooperate with the CM in this way, thereby providing 
NGOs with a visible impact on state behavior. 
Writing an action report and undertaking the necessary work to 
complete it also provides NGOs access to information that may make filing 
NGO reports easier. In fact, NGOs often write reports that respond to and 
criticize claims by states in their action reports. A report filed by the Helsinki 
Foundation for Human Rights on February 26, 2014 is a good example.106 
This report is more than twenty pages long, and primarily casts doubts on 
and critiques claims made by Poland in the action report it filed in response 
to the Trzaska group of cases107 concerning excessive length of pre-trial 
detentions. 
Table 7 displays information about states’ tendency to file action 
reports in cases that led to NGO reports conditioned on the states’ reputation: 
 
Table 7: Filing Action Reports Conditioned on States’ Reputations 
Reputation Level  No Action Report 
filed 
Action Report Filed 
Later Than 6 
Months After Final 
Judgment  
Action Report Filed 
Within 6 Months 
From Final  
Judgment  
1 (Disregard)  0% 0% 0% 
2 (Disregard) 0% 100.00% 0% 
3 (High Reputation)  16.67% 70.00% 13.33% 
4 (High Reputation) 29.03% 48.39% 22.58% 
5 (Low Reputation)  29.33% 61.33% 9.33% 
When the tendency of high-reputation states to file action reports is 
compared to that of low-reputation states, the differences are not statistically 
significant.108 Differences in states’ tendency to file action reports on time 
are not statistically significant either.109 Therefore, the data do not suggest 
that NGOs focus on high-reputation states simply because they are more 
likely than low-reputation states to cooperate with the CM. 
3. Willingness to Comply with Judgments 
Another factor that NGOs may take into account is the willingness of 
states to comply with the ECHR’s judgments that garnered NGO attention. 
Compliance may indicate that a state cares about the reputational sanction 
attached to its misbehavior and is willing to sustain the costs of compliance 
to avoid this reputational sanction. Nonetheless, a state may also comply 
 
 106. NGO Report (2014)356. 
 107. See Trzaska v. Poland, App. No. 25792/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000) (unpublished), http://hudoc.ech 
r.coe.int/eng?i=001-58750. 
 108. P value of 0.4395. 
 109. P value of 0.2026. 
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with a judgment without changing its behavior in other areas. NGOs may 
still have an incentive to file reports against states that usually comply with 
ECHR judgments subject to such reports, because this allows NGOs to claim 
they played a role in facilitating state compliance. 
If a state complies fully with an ECHR judgment, the CM will close the 
case. This is the strongest possible indication of full state compliance. Table 
8 presents data on cases that led to NGO reports that were closed by the CM 
until January 2015. 
 
Table 8: Cases Closed by the Committee of Ministers 
State Average Level of 
Reputation 
Cases Closed by January 
2015 
Cases Still Pending as of 
January 2015 
1 (Disregard)  0% 0% 
2 (Disregard) 0% 100.00% 
3 (High Reputation)  23.33% 76.67% 
4 (High Reputation)  9.68% 90.32% 
5 (Low Reputation)  9.33% 90.67% 
The difference between the proportion of cases closed in high-
reputation states and in low-reputation states is not statistically significant.110 
There is, therefore, no reason to suspect that NGOs focus their attention on 
high-reputation states only because these states are likely to quickly comply 
with ECHR judgments that draw NGO attention. 
4. NGO Past Involvement 
Another possible factor affecting the results may be that NGOs were 
involved in the case at initial stages by filing amicus curiae briefs, and then 
followed up on the case by filing reports regarding noncompliance. The 
possibility that NGOs are interested in monitoring compliance in cases they 
participated in as friends of the court, or even as legal representatives of the 
applicants, is certainly intuitive; NGOs that already acquainted themselves 
with the information pertaining to a certain issue—and moreover staked their 
reputation on their success to change state practice on this issue—are likely 
to monitor compliance with the judgment.111 Furthermore, some NGO 
officials stressed that it is considered bad practice in the NGO community to 
get involved in cases that were first litigated by other NGOs without their 
permission.112 Others emphasized that following a case through and making 
sure the judgment is implemented is part of their holistic strategy of initiating 
 
 110. P value of 0.2977. 
 111. See Shai Dothan, Luring NGOs to International Courts: A Comment on CLR v. Romania, 75 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 635, 643–44 (2015). 
 112. Skype Interview with Official, Russian Justice Initiative (June 1, 2015). 
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social change.113 Still others said that if they represented applicants, they 
view themselves as obligated to ensure that the judgment they received will 
be implemented as fully as is feasible. This is simply part of the service they 
provide.114 
This conjecture is also confirmed by the data: out of the twenty-six 
cases in the pool of cases that led to NGO reports that had an NGO who 
submitted an amicus curiae brief, fifteen cases included at least one report 
by at least one of the NGOs who were involved as a friend of the court. The 
other eleven cases included reports filed only by other NGOs. Considering 
the number and diversity of potential NGOs, these figures are revealing. 
NGOs often participate in cases informally by sending their lawyers to 
represent applicants or even funding legal assistance by external lawyers.115 
However, this type of informal participation is much more difficult to track 
and to quantify than participation as a friend of the court, which is regularly 
mentioned in the body of the judgment. 
The data suggest that NGO involvement as third parties does not 
explain the practice of filing more NGO reports against high-reputation 
states than against low-reputation states. Out of seventy-five cases that 
concerned low-reputation states, ten (13.33%) included NGOs as friends of 
the court. Out of sixty-one cases that concerned high-reputation states, 
fifteen (24.59%) included NGOs as friends of the court. The difference 
between the propensities of high-reputation states and low-reputation states 
to attract the involvement of NGOs as amicus curiae is not statistically 
significant.116 The claim that NGO involvement as third parties explains 
patterns in the filing of NGO reports is therefore not supported by the data. 
 
 113. Skype Interview with Lawyer, Minority Rights Group International (June 11, 2015). 
 114. Phone Conversation with Lawyer, European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (June 25, 2015). 
 115. See, e.g., P. and S. v. Poland, App. No. 57375/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
eng?i=001-114098 [https://perma.cc/3ZMH-3RY6] (where lawyers from the Center for Reproductive 
Rights assisted with the representation of the applicants). The Center for Reproductive Rights later filed 
a report concerning this case. See LOVEDAY HODSON, NGOS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN EUROPE 55–56 (2011) (suggesting that a large part of the involvement of NGOs in ECHR proceedings 
is informal). 
Another possibility worth mentioning is that an NGO would serve as an applicant itself. See, e.g., 
Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 302/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.i 
nt/eng?i=001-99221 [https://perma.cc/WK3C-LPSS] (where the applicant is itself an NGO). In this case, 
the applicant NGO didn’t file a report, but other NGOs did. In contrast, in the case of Genderdoc-M v. 
Moldova, App. No. 9106/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-111394 
[https://perma.cc/4HMB-Q84S] the applicant is an NGO who later filed a joint report with another NGO. 
 116. P value of 0.1196. Notice this compares both data on friends of the court that filed reports and 
data on those that didn’t file reports, that is, when only other NGOs filed reports. The reason is that this 
test assumes that filing the amicus curiae brief by itself generates an incentive for the NGO who filed the 
brief to file a report later on, as could other forms of intervention that may not be visible from the case. 
To complete the picture, only seven (11.48%) cases in high-reputation states and seven (9.33%) cases in 
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5. A Concentration of Severe and Important Violations in High-
Reputation States 
Finally, there exists a potential alternative explanation that is largely 
non-intuitive: maybe there is a greater proportion of cases that involve severe 
violations or important legal issues concerning high-reputation states than 
low-reputation states. As Part II shows, NGOs focus their attention on severe 
and important cases. If high-reputation states commit on average more 
severe violations or lead to more important cases, maybe this is the reason 
why they face more NGO reports. 
It is unlikely that the cases directed at high-reputation states involve, on 
average, more severe violations. This possibility can be checked by 
comparing the proportion of ECHR judgments among the general population 
finding severe violations in low-reputation states and in high-reputation 
states. In fact, there are proportionally more cases involving violations of 
Articles 2, 3, and 13 in low-reputation states,117 and these differences are 
statistically significant.118 This is consistent with the simple intuition that 
low-reputation states are generally responsible for more severe violations. 
On the other hand, there are proportionally more Article 14 violations in 
high-reputation states.119 This difference is statistically significant as well,120 
suggesting that high-reputation states may be especially prone to unlawful 
discrimination between individuals, or at least are more often accused of 
such practice.121 
High-reputation states also draw a greater proportion of important 
cases. 0.97% of the cases filed against low-reputation states in the general 
population of cases are classified as Case Reports, and 2.11% are classified 
as Importance Level 1. The corresponding figures for high-reputation states 
are 4.31% and 5.09%. When the propensity to generate either Case Reports, 
 
low-reputation states have a report by an NGO who submitted itself an amicus curiae brief. This 
difference is not statistically significant (P value of 0.7796). It is also possible that NGOs may be 
influenced by other NGOs’ participation: namely, NGOs may be motivated to file reports by the 
involvement of other NGOs as friends of the court. All this leads to the hypothesis that the reports against 
high-reputation states are caused by a greater propensity of NGOs to file amicus briefs vis-à-vis these 
states. Yet, since no such propensity appears in the data, the hypothesis is rejected. 
 117. In low-reputation states, 7.16% of the judgments found Article 2 violations, 17.74% found 
Article 3 violations, and 11.09% found Article 13 violations. In high-reputation states, the respective 
figures are: 1.86%, 25.69%, and 9.16%. 
 118. P values of less than 0.0001 for Articles 2 and 3, and a P value of 0.0296 for Article 13. 
 119. In low-reputation states, 1.01% found Article 14 violations. In high-reputation states, the 
relevant figure is 3.59%. 
 120. P value of less than 0.0001. 
 121. Note that for this calculation, judgments in the general population directed against two states 
that include a violation were counted twice (even if the judgment found a violation was committed only 
by one state). Because these cases are very rare, this should not affect the result. 
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Importance Level 1 cases, or cases of these two categories combined is 
compared, all these differences are statistically significant.122 
This raises a question: is it the importance of the cases filed against 
high-reputation states that explains their greater propensity to attract NGO 
reports? To answer this question, the importance levels of cases that actually 
led to NGO reports can be compared. 26.67% of the cases that led to NGO 
reports filed against low-reputation states are Case Reports cases and 22.67% 
are categorized as Importance Level 1. The figures for high-reputation states 
are 36.07% and 14.75%. When comparing the propensity of a case to be 
categorized at the highest level of importance (Case Reports) or at the two 
highest levels combined (Case Reports and Level 1), no statistically 
significant differences appear.123 Therefore, while high-reputation states 
may indeed usually draw more important cases, this difference cannot 
explain the fact that they are subject to more NGO reports, since cases that 
led to NGO reports do not significantly differ in their importance between 
high and low-reputation states. 
To complete the picture, it is possible to compare the severity of cases 
that led to NGO reports in low-reputation states and in high-reputation states. 
This test can help refute a more distant possibility—although high-reputation 
states are generally responsible for less severe violations (besides issues of 
discrimination under Article 14), perhaps they are responsible for more 
severe violations discussed in cases of a special quality (such as legal 
importance) that usually draw the attention of NGOs. The only article 
indicating severity that is more common in high-reputation states is Article 
14, but the difference concerning this article is not statistically significant.124 
In contrast, the tendency of low-reputation states to generate more violations 
of Articles 3 and 13 that led to NGO reports is statistically significant at the 
0.1 level.125 An additional test for a violation’s severity is the amount of just 
satisfaction issued in the case. Comparing the just satisfaction issued in cases 
that led to NGO reports in low-reputation states and in high-reputation states 
does not find statistically significant differences.126 
 
 122. All three comparisons lead to P values of less than 0.0001. 
 123. P values of 0.2663 and 1.0000, respectively. 
 124. Of the cases filed against low-reputation states that led to NGO reports, 16.00% concerned 
Article 2 violations, 34.67% concerned Article 3 violations, 26.67% concerned Article 13 violations, and 
10.67% concerned Article 14 violations. In cases filed against high-reputation states, 9.84% concerned 
Article 2 violations, 19.67% concerned Article 3 violations, 13.11% concerned Article 13 violations, and 
16.39% concerned Article 14 violations. 
 125. Article 3 – P value of 0.0576; Article 13 – P value of 0.0580. 
 126. In low-reputation states, 16.00% of the cases that led to NGO reports involved just satisfaction 
of more than 100,000 Euros, and 50.67% involved just satisfaction of more than 10,000 Euros. In high-
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The data suggest that judgments discussing severe violations of the kind 
that is likely to draw NGO reports are not more commonly issued against 
high-reputation states than against low-reputation states. Perhaps the 
opposite is correct. It seems only natural to conclude that there are more 
severe violations committed by low-reputation states that led to NGO 
reports, although the data are not very strong on this point. If reports against 
low-reputation states do indeed target more severe violations, the reason may 
be that low-reputation states simply commit a greater share of the most 
severe violations in Europe. But it is also possible to interpret this admittedly 
weak data as further support for the argument that NGOs are more willing to 
file reports against high-reputation states. This conclusion can be reached 
because the data suggest that NGOs are willing to extend their shaming 
efforts even to less severe violations committed by high-reputation states. 
The human rights standards required from high-reputation states may simply 
be higher. If high-reputation states commit violations of lesser severity—that 
would not lead to reports if committed by low-reputation states—they may 
nevertheless be subject to reports. 
D. Conclusions about the Focus of NGOs on High-Reputation States 
This part presents a systematic way to divide states in Europe into high-
reputation states and low-reputation states. It shows that NGOs issue more 
reports per judgment related to judgments involving high-reputation states 
than related to judgments involving low-reputation states. This suggests that 
high-reputation states are more vulnerable to reputational sanctions than 
low-reputation states. Several alternative explanations for NGOs’ tendency 
to focus on high-reputation states specifically within the DEJ procedure were 
examined, but none of these explanations finds support in the data. 
IV. WHAT DO NGOS REALLY WANT? 
Parts II and III present certain patterns in the issues and the states on 
which NGOs focus their shaming efforts. These patterns may reveal 
important insight into the nature of reputational sanctions in international 
law. They may reveal, for example, when reputational sanctions cause the 
most damage, and how accurate is the information transmitted by shaming 
efforts. These insights are the subject of Part V. Before jumping to general 
insights about reputation, though, the characteristics of the NGOs that 
published on the DEJ website must be studied. By exposing the incentives 
of the NGOs involved, it is possible to verify if these incentives, rather than 
 
reputation states, the corresponding figures are 6.56% and 42.62%. The differences are not statistically 
significant: more than 100,000 Euros (P value of 0.1117); more than 10,000 Euros (P value of 0.3904). 
DOTHAN - FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2017  12:11 PM 
174 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 27:141 
the general nature of reputational sanctions, are responsible for the observed 
patterns of NGO behavior. 
A. Separating NGOs According to Size 
As a first take on this problem, it may be helpful to check if NGOs act 
differently depending on their size. If the core players using the DEJ website 
are large, well-funded NGOs, maybe they are simply following the interests 
of their patrons. Could it be that donors from rich democracies support NGOs 
that focus on their own countries of origin because of the donors’ liberal 
commitments? If this bias is strong enough, the greater wealth and larger 
human rights community in high-reputation states may very well explain the 
focus of NGOs on this type of states. 
Yet the data shows that big NGOs are actually responsible for a very 
small part of the reports filed on the DEJ website. The world-wide NGO 
Human Rights Watch is only responsible for addressing a single case. Even 
the global mega-organization Amnesty International was involved in filing 
reports in only seven cases. Liberty is an NGO focused on human rights in 
the United Kingdom, but at the same time, some consider it to be the most 
frequent litigator before the ECHR.127 Yet despite its involvement at the trial 
phase, this major NGO was involved in reports addressing only one case.128 
No less telling is the fact that in all the cases targeted by reports from these 
three major players, other NGOs also filed the same or other reports. 
Furthermore, even this miniscule sample of reports by the big three 
organizations is evenly divided between four cases concerning high-
reputation states and four cases concerning low-reputation states.129 
This suggests that the community of NGOs is actually incredibly 
diverse. More than two hundred organizations, big and small, domestic, 
European, and global in focus submitted reports and took part in the efforts 
to shame states for noncompliance. In this open and teeming community, 
fears of a centralized strategy orchestrated by a few tycoons or stemming 
from the wealth inequalities between European states can be alleviated. 
 
 127. See HODSON, supra note 115, at 107. 
 128. It may be interesting to theorize about the reasons large organizations filed so few reports. 
Perhaps these reports are used only by organizations that cannot make an impact in another way. Perhaps 
the large number of workers at large NGOs, each with her own specialty, prevents one person for having 
the set of skills necessary for filing a report: a familiarity both with the specific subject matter and the 
machinery of the CM. 
 129. Amnesty International even signed a report for the only case in the sample from a “reputation 
level 2” state, which is excluded from the analysis in Part III. 
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B. The Incentives of NGOs 
Alleviated perhaps, but not eliminated. Several conversations with 
NGO activists revealed that foundations that fund NGOs have developed a 
strategy to bend these organizations to their will. More and more foundations 
would earmark certain funds for certain purposes such as aiding a specific 
right or a specific region.130 Small NGOs need money for things as trivial as 
office supplies and paying salaries. They are forced to take the directives of 
these foundations seriously.131 If powerful foundations use this technique 
efficiently, they could operate indirectly through countless tentacles and 
sway the general attention of civil society in a specific direction. 
Some foundations openly champion this strategy of operating from 
multiple NGOs simultaneously. The European Program for Integration and 
Migration (“EPIM”) even takes centralization up a level. It is a collaboration 
of thirteen European foundations that work together to strengthen civil 
society organizations. EPIM does not only give grants; it also organizes 
workshops and funds professional training for NGOs to build their 
knowledge and capacities. Furthermore, it supports networking between 
NGOs to facilitate mutual learning and collaboration.132 Another major 
network of NGOs, created in 1994, is the Human Rights House Network. It 
unites ninety NGOs in Europe and Africa that cooperate with one another in 
an effort to improve their effectiveness.133 Though the different NGOs are 
independent, the secretariat of this large network, based in Oslo, can 
doubtlessly exert substantial influence on the actions of civil society across 
Europe and beyond. Some wealthy countries, especially Scandinavian 
countries, do not operate solely through foundations. Rather, they directly 
fund NGOs supporting causes they care about.134 
To address the possibility that centralized power lies behind the 
observed patterns in NGO behavior, it is vital to talk to NGO officials and 
see what it is they really aim at achieving, taking their commitments and 
constraints into account. 
This much seems clear from the interviews: high-reputation states 
cannot expect an especially lenient treatment because of their status. One 
 
 130. Foundations differ in how strictly they monitor spending, but often reports of spending must be 
quite accurate. Skype conversation with NGO Lawyer 10 (June 12, 2015). 
 131. Interview with NGO Lawyer 1 (Apr. 14, 2015). 
 132. See About EPIM, EUROPEAN PROGRAMME FOR IMMIGRATION AND MIGRATION, http://www.ep 
im.info/ [https://perma.cc/LZ7D-WY9X]. 
 133. See About the Human Rights House Network, HUMAN RIGHTS HOUSE NETWORK, 
http://humanrightshouse.org/noop/page.php?p=HRHN/index.html&d=1 [https://perma.cc/BM5W-SRS 
S]. 
 134. Skype interview with Lawyer, Minority Rights Group International (June 11, 2015). 
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NGO lawyer suggested that if a violation was proven against a state, then, 
by definition, it behaves imperfectly and should not be granted any favors by 
NGOs.135 Another NGO lawyer stressed repeatedly that even the most highly 
acclaimed democracies commit violations and crimes.136 Interviewees 
focused on the need to make a difference in the world. This suggests that the 
most energy should not be dedicated to the best behaving states—they 
behave well anyway—nor to the worst behaving states—they are unlikely to 
change their behavior in any case—but instead to states located somewhere 
in the middle. That is, states that commit violations, but could be pressured 
to correct them.137 
NGO activists who focus on high-reputation states stress that their 
government is often receptive to criticism. For example, an official at 
Association Nationale d’Assistance aux Frontières pour les Étrangers 
(“ANAFE”)—a French NGO assisting foreigners at the border—said that 
lawyers and officials in France care about ECHR judgments and change their 
practices to avoid future violations. ANAFE built a reputation as an expert 
on migration, and French bureaucrats learn from it and communicate with it 
directly. For ANAFE, NGO reports like those studied in this Article, serve 
as a complementary method to communicate indirectly with French officials. 
This method carries beneficial results on the ground as state officials learn 
from the reports and change their behavior.138 
This stands in sharp contrast to the conditions NGOs face in low-
reputation states. A Romanian NGO lawyer confessed that he did not believe 
NGO reports have any direct impact on Romania, which replies to their 
reports in an utterly unhelpful manner. Instead, the NGO’s strategy is to exert 
pressure on the CM in the hope that the CM would, in turn, pressure the 
Romanian government.139 In Russia, NGOs singled out the CM machinery 
as the only effective way to get information from their government. Russian 
officials do not communicate with NGOs. Consequently, activists can only 
get the data they need to pursue further legal action by acting indirectly 
through the Strasbourg system.140 While in other countries, such as 
Lithuania, NGOs are in direct contact with their government delegations to 
the CM,141 Russian NGO lawyers speak to delegations of other countries at 
 
 135. Interview with NGO Lawyer 1 (Apr. 14, 2015). 
 136. Skype interview with NGO Lawyer 11 (July 3, 2015). 
 137. Interview with NGO Lawyer 1 (Apr. 14, 2015). 
 138. Telephone Interview with Official, ANAFE (May 27, 2015). 
 139. Skype Interview with Romanian NGO Lawyer 9 (May 25, 2015). 
 140. Skype Interview with Official, Russian Justice Initiative (June 1, 2015). 
 141. Skype Interview with NGO Activist 2 (May 2, 2015). 
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the CM to urge them to criticize Russia in the CM’s closed meetings. Such 
efforts may have led to interim resolutions against Russia.142 
So far, it seems that NGOs’ focus on high-reputation states is justified 
by the willingness of these states to change their practices due to criticism, 
which, in turn, directly relates to the value they put on their reputation. But 
the picture is more complex than that. In low-reputation states, NGOs are 
often subject to effective national measures meant to suppress their activity. 
NGOs in Russia—at least those which receive money from abroad or engage 
in actions such as advocacy that involve foreigners—are forced by law to 
declare themselves as “foreign agents” in all their official documents. This 
designation carries a powerful stigma, something akin to calling yourself a 
spy. Furthermore, NGOs are subject to daily acts of harassment by countless 
forms of bureaucratic hurdles. They have to submit numerous forms and be 
subject to frequent inspection. Add to that a public sentiment that views 
human rights activity as a form of foreign intervention and as a reason for 
Russia’s financial problems and you have a potential reason for the relative 
paucity of NGO actions vis-à-vis Russia.143 
Russia and other states coded here as having low reputations are not 
alone in their actions against NGO activity. In Azerbaijan, civil society 
activists are subject to false arrests, to unjustified searches, and even to 
violence. Furthermore, the government funds so-called Government-
Organized Non-Governmental Organizations (“GONGOs”)—
governmentally controlled organizations built and funded for the sole 
purpose of infiltrating and corrupting the human rights community.144 In 
other post-communist countries, such as Serbia, there is simply no culture of 
philanthropic investment in fighting for the public interest.145 This is a 
striking difference from countries such as the Netherlands where, with a 
population of less than 17 million, Amnesty International alone boasts 
255,000 members and over 560,000 volunteers.146 Cultural differences and 
differences in government practice may certainly affect the results found in 
this Article. Furthermore, the procedure investigated here is relatively new 
 
 142. Skype Interview with Official, Russian Justice Initiative (June 1, 2015). 
 143. Skype Interview with Russian NGO Activist 4 (May 15, 2015). Another NGO official admitted 
that Russian counter-measures proved effective in leading some Russian NGOs to keep a low profile in 
the media. Skype Interview with Official, Russian Justice Initiative (June 1, 2015). 
 144. In Azerbaijan as the Last Remnants of Democracy are Being Destroyed, Some Watch in 
Silence), MEYDANTV (Oct. 29, 2014) http://www.meydan.tv/en/site/society/3532/In-Azerbaijan-as-
the-last-remnants-of-democracy-are-being-destroyed-some-watch-in-silence-(part-2—%E2%80%9CG 
ONGO%E2%80%9Dids).htm [https://perma.cc/38QT-B3TW]. 
 145. Skype Interview with NGO Lawyer 3 (May 4, 2015). 
 146. Amnesty International the Netherlands, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, https://www.amnesty.nl/en 
glish [https://perma.cc/R6V2-B4Y4]. 
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and many NGOs in low-reputation states may simply be unaware of it.147 
This, however, may also be true for NGOs in high-reputation states.148 
Despite these caveats, one cannot ignore the fact that there are still 
numerous NGOs that do target low-reputation states. Many of them, in fact, 
are based in other countries and collaborate with local organizations. To 
understand NGO activity, one must consider not only the organizations’ 
constraints, but also the goals that NGOs are trying, often successfully, to 
achieve. NGO activists stress that they are committed to making a social 
change.149 They insist that they care about actual results, not about the 
reputation of their own institution.150 If others can do the work better, so they 
say, they would let them take the credit for it.151 This attitude explains why 
NGOs try to cooperate with as many other NGOs as possible in pursuit of a 
common cause.152 
But this may be an overly complacent view. NGOs are not just trying 
to make the world better by any means possible. First, many NGOs have a 
specific mandate set in advance. For example, the Lithuanian Gay League 
fights for equality regardless of sexual orientation in Lithuania, not for other 
worthy causes or for rights in other countries.153 Second, NGOs try to prevent 
an overlap with other organizations and to do things others are not doing.154 
Most importantly, NGOs compete for a limited amount of funds from a 
limited number of grants and foundations. This is a recipe for jealousy and 
competition. Some activists voiced resentment toward bigger NGOs that win 
large grants by investing the money they receive in internal administration 
and leaving the actual work to smaller NGOs which struggle for survival.155 
Others insist that NGOs mark their territory and get upset when others 
intervene—for example, by filing reports in cases they initiated.156 
None of this detracts from the fruitful cooperation that does exist 
between NGOs. NGO activists help each other to form connections and to 
collect information.157 They meet one another in conferences158 and in joint 
 
 147. Skype Interview with Russian NGO Activist 4 (May 15, 2015). 
 148. Skype Interview with Lawyer, Minority Rights Group International (June 11, 2015). 
 149. Skype Interview with Lawyer, Minority Rights Group International (June 11, 2015). 
 150. Skype Interview with NGO Activist 2 (May 2, 2015). 
 151. Interview with NGO Lawyer 1 (Apr. 14, 2015). 
 152. Skype Interview with NGO Activist 8 (May 20, 2015). 
 153. See Mission and Goals, ASSOCIATION LITHUANIAN GAY LEAGUE, http://www.lgl.lt/en/?page_id 
=116 [https://perma.cc/8GPU-ZFHM]. 
 154. Skype Interview with NGO Lawyer 3 (May 4, 2015). 
 155. Skype Interview with NGO Lawyer 3 (May 4, 2015). 
 156. Skype Interview with Official, Russian Justice Initiative (June 1, 2015). 
 157. Skype Interview with NGO Activist 2 (May 2, 2015). 
 158. Skype Interview with NGO Activist 8 (May 20, 2015). 
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training sessions where they engage with other people they could turn to for 
advice in the future.159 Language barriers sometimes make NGO 
collaboration difficult, so do differences in institutional culture, such as the 
unequal time it takes to reply to an email.160 NGOs struggle to collaborate 
despite these challenges. At the same time, NGOs engage in other forms of 
collaboration. While there are NGOs that simply send reports as letters to the 
CM,161 others have a fruitful cooperation with its members.162 While some 
NGOs do not use the media because they deal with less salient issues,163 
others actively try to shape public policy by using the media.164 
To conclude, despite facing different challenges, NGOs in high-
reputation states and in low-reputation states are both adapting their 
strategies to the realities they are facing. Generally speaking, NGOs are 
committed to social change, even if some of their policies are mediated by 
self-interest. Criticizing high-reputation states is likely to be more successful 
because state officials care about the reputation of their country and are 
willing to work hard to preserve it. Consequently, a focus on high-reputation 
states is only to be expected. Some low-reputation states care so little about 
their reputation that they are even willing to launch a public battle against 
the human rights community, despite the inevitable reputational costs that 
such a policy entails.165 
V. IMPROVING REPUTATIONAL ASSESSMENTS 
The analysis of states’ reputation so far collects data on the behavior of 
states and on the shaming efforts against them. In contrast, states’ reputation 
is actually a belief of the international community about the states’ past 
behavior—their failure to comply with ECHR judgments—that can help 
predict their future behavior: their propensity to fulfill their international 
obligations.166 This belief is plagued by uncertainty on two accounts: 
information about the nature of the states’ actions is ambiguous and the 
 
 159. Skype Interview with NGO Activist 5 (May 15, 2015). 
 160. Skype Interview with Russian NGO Activist 4 (May 15, 2015). 
 161. Skype Interview with Romanian NGO Lawyer 9 (May 25, 2015). 
 162. Skype Interview with NGO Activist 2 (May 2, 2015). 
 163. Telephone Interview with Official, ANAFE (May 27, 2015). 
 164. Skype Interview with Lawyer, Minority Rights Group International (June 11, 2015). 
 165. See Miriam Elder, Russia Raids Human Rights Groups in Crackdown on ‘Foreign Agents’, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/27/russia-raids-human-rights-
crackdown [https://perma.cc/J2FZ-TGH2] (citing foreign officials’ and NGOs’ criticism of Russian 
policies in this regard). 
 166. See Gregory D. Miller, Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past, 
12 SECURITY STUDIES 40, 42 (2003) (using a similar definition of reputation as: “. . . a judgment about 
an actor’s past behavior that is used to predict future behavior”). 
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judgments formed by spectators of the states’ actions may be biased. This 
Article addresses these problems in turn. 
A. Imperfect Information Makes Every Deed Count 
NGO reports are primarily a method of exposing information about 
states’ compliance with ECHR judgments. But even strong and committed 
NGOs do not have access to all of the necessary facts. They must form 
impressions based on partial and imperfect information, and these 
impressions may certainly be wrong. 
Furthermore, even if the facts of the matter are clear, they may still be 
subject to interpretation. The ECHR often issues judgments that require 
several types of measures: paying compensation for damages, undertaking 
specific measures to redress the violation, and making general legal changes 
to amend the root cause of the violation.167 If a state complies with some of 
these dictates, but not with others, it is unclear whether it should be branded 
as failing to comply with its obligations. 
The problems of dealing with partial compliance are demonstrated in a 
report filed against the government of Azerbaijan by the Media Rights 
Institute, a NGO based in that country. The report concerned how Azerbaijan 
complied with judgments that found it violated the right to freedom of 
expression guaranteed by the Convention when it imprisoned certain 
journalists for defamation.168 The NGO noted that the journalists whose 
rights were violated received full compensation and were released from 
prison. Yet at the same time it stressed that these journalists were pardoned 
and not retried, and that the legal changes attempted by Azerbaijan did not 
suffice to prevent future violations.169 Calibrating the level of Azerbaijan’s 
compliance is a complex matter. It requires not only surveying the facts, but 
also making difficult value judgments. 
Another problem with detecting compliance is how to treat delay in a 
state’s actions.170 When states are required to undertake structural changes 
to their legal system, they never comply instantaneously, nor are they 
expected to. But what constitutes a reasonable delay? After how long can 
observers deduce a state is truly unwilling to comply with a judgment? And 
 
 167. Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, 528. 
 168. DH-DD(2013)971, Communication from a NGO (Media Rights Institute) (12/09/2013) in the 
cases of Mahmudov and Agazade and Fatullayev against Azerbaijan (Apps. No. 35877/04 and 40984/08) 
(2013). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. 
L. REV. 1, 28 (2005). 
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if a state complies after this point in time, what does this say about its 
reputation?171 
The uncertainty shrouding states’ reputations runs even deeper than 
that. States build their reputation by signaling not only to NGOs but 
primarily to other states that they are willing to sustain certain costs in order 
to maintain their reputation for the future. No one expects states to suffer 
limitless costs. Even a state that cares deeply about its reputation will only 
comply if the reputational sanction it will suffer by noncompliance is greater 
than the costs entailed by compliance. The problem is that there is no way 
for NGOs to observe the true costs of compliance for the state. 
The actual costs of compliance are unobservable because when the 
court requires complex legal measures, undertaking them can lead to all sorts 
of consequences. If the state is required to release prisoners, for example, 
compliance may damage deterrence of certain crimes. It may also lead to 
public opposition to the government from certain groups in society. If a 
government is required to change its laws, doing so may jeopardize its policy 
goals in a variety of ways. Furthermore, compliance with a judgment has an 
expressive function, which creates its own costs. States may perceive 
compliance as an acknowledgment of guilt that has reputational 
consequences. In contrast, they may view compliance as exonerating the 
state from guilt for the initial violation by paying the price that legitimizes 
its actions.172 Finally, state compliance sets a precedent for its behavior, a 
precedent it may be pressured to follow in the future at its own cost.173 
If the costs of the state were observable, only the most demanding 
judgment a state complied with would count as a signal, because it indicates 
the limit of what the state is willing to pay to preserve its reputation. 
Compliance with less demanding judgments would signal nothing new about 
the state’s reputation.174 In contrast, because real costs of compliance are 
unobservable, there is always a possibility that a certain judgment costs more 
 
 171. If a state complies after a long time, it may have already endured severe reputational damage 
only part of which can be rebuilt by noncompliance. The state’s willingness to shoulder the costs of 
compliance for this partial rehabilitation of its reputation indicate that it views the reputational sanction 
as particularly large and should therefore signal its high reputation. At the same time, the state’s 
reluctance to comply earlier on should serve as a negative reputational signal. Moreover, if as time passed 
conditions changed and made compliance less costly, as is often the case, the belated compliance should 
count as a weaker signal of the state’s good reputation. 
 172. Cf. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13–14 (2000) 
(describing how people sometimes view fines as a price the payment of which erases all guilt for the 
initial transgression). 
 173. See DOTHAN, supra note 95, at 30–32. 
 174. See ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS – A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 83 
(2008) (arguing that if a state behaves according to prior expectations, this may affirm its reputation but 
would not change it). 
DOTHAN - FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2017  12:11 PM 
182 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 27:141 
than the state was previously willing to pay. As a result, every action of 
compliance sends a signal that increases the state’s reputation. But although 
the international community cannot know for sure how demanding 
compliance would turn out to be, it certainly has assessments about the costs 
of compliance. Compliance with a judgment that appears more demanding, 
even if its compliance costs cannot be perfectly calibrated, would lead to a 
much higher reputational boost than a judgment that appears to require only 
cheaper actions.175 
The reputation of states is therefore flexible. A state’s actions—or, 
more accurately, the stipulations of actors in the international community 
about these actions—constantly change the state’s reputation for better or for 
worse. It seems reasonable to assume that as these stipulations multiply, the 
state’s reputation would lead to increasingly better predictions of the state’s 
conduct. Mistakes and exaggerations by different actors about the state’s past 
conduct would offset one another, and the true character of the state would 
gradually be revealed. 
In a community composed of states and their leaders, an additional 
mechanism may improve the assessments of states’ reputation even further: 
states will acquire a reputation for reliability in their accusations against 
other states. As the network between the states develops to include strong 
multiple ties, states will learn which states they can trust to tell the truth about 
the conduct of other states. As states learn to ascribe differing degrees of 
credibility to stipulations on other states, their assessments of the reputations 
of these states will constantly improve.176 
B. Opening the Shaming Community to Prevent Echo 
The analysis so far describes a network that sociologists define as 
complying with the so-called “bandwidth hypothesis”: the network 
resembles a pipe through which information is transmitted; the denser the 
 
 175. See DOTHAN, supra note 95, at 19–20 (suggesting that although states gain a lot of reputational 
capital from compliance with a demanding judgment, this judgment usually indicates that the state 
initially committed a severe violation, which could damage its reputation. This Article, however, is 
focused only on the conditions prevailing after the violation already occurred and the judgment against 
the state was issued. At this point in time, state’s conduct can rebuild its reputation by compliance or 
damage it by noncompliance). 
 176. Reliability is an asset that can serve states in the long term, but it involves costs in the short 
term, such as investing in data gathering and facing up to difficult and unpopular truths. Therefore, states 
with low discount rates—which are also likely to have high reputations for compliance with international 
law, as argued in Part VI—are going to be considered generally more reliable. The quest for reliability 
and the quest for compliance reputation intertwine; as states pursue both, they have an incentive to lead 
international opinion on other states’ reputations in the right direction. 
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network, the wider the pipe and the more accurate information becomes.177 
But sociologists also speak about a competing hypothesis, a hypothesis that 
unfortunately may more accurately represent the tension existing between 
states in the Council of Europe. It is called the “echo hypothesis” and it 
argues that information flow within a dense network is not enhanced but 
rather corrupted. As actors report the actions of others, they do not say the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth. Instead, they are biased by their prior 
dispositions as well as the dispositions of the actors with which they 
interact.178 For example, states may be predisposed to think of states with 
low-reputations as bad actors. Therefore, when they describe their actions, 
they will paint them in negative colors. These biased reports will then be 
echoed by other predisposed states, and the reputations of the accused states 
will plummet. In this example, in contrast with the data uncovered in this 
Article about the activity of NGOs, high-reputation states stand to gain from 
the echo effect because reports about their behavior will usually be positive 
and drive their reputation upwards. 
Sociologists run complex tests on networks to determine whether they 
comply with the echo hypothesis or the bandwidth hypothesis. Devising such 
tests for the multifaceted diplomatic interactions of states seems nearly 
impossible. But there is another, more sinister factor that creates a real 
danger for an echo effect in the Council of Europe. This factor is the fact that 
states which accuse other states may suffer painful political repercussions. 
Sadly, states are not only committed to the protection of human rights within 
and outside their borders. When a state critiques another state, the ties 
between the two are almost universally damaged. States that want to 
maintain their friendship with the accused state are also likely to shun the 
accuser. States may also use accusations to attack their enemies, contributing 
their share to the corruption of the system of reputation. 
The Council of Europe is a close-knit community. In such a community, 
formal accusations are likely to be rare, because no state wants to damage its 
international ties.179 After all, such a process was already attempted: states 
can bring cases against other states in the ECHR system according to the 
Convention. But this process led to very few cases, many of which were 
 
 177. See RONALD S. BURT, BROKERAGE AND CLOSURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CAPITAL 
167–68 (2005). 
 178. See id. 
 179. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 60–61 
(1991) (describing a similar close-knit community of farmers in the Shasta County where close ties 
usually prevent farmers from bringing each other to court). 
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plainly political pay-backs,180 suggesting that powerful states or states with 
apparently high-reputations may not be subject to any shaming efforts by 
other states even if they commit human rights violations. 
In contrast, powerless and low-reputations states may be subject to 
repeated accusations, some of which will likely be false or exaggerated. 
Accusations against such states can start from purely egotistical motives, as 
a way for states to distance themselves from the accused state and to curry 
favor with its adversaries. Once accusations start, they may echo and 
multiply. As states share information about the accused state, they reinforce 
each other’s predispositions and their views are amplified. The result of this 
process is that when states interact with each other in a closed system, the 
reputations of states will be pushed to extremes: either very low or very high 
reputation, depending on what can be a relatively arbitrary starting point. 
A different way to frame this problem is to recognize the potential for 
a so-called “cascade” of views. Cascades occur when members of a group 
change their opinions by following others. Reputational cascades occur 
when group members are pressured to follow each other to avoid reputational 
loss. Informational cascades occur when group members try to learn from 
each other’s decisions to improve their own policies.181 Both types of 
cascades may materialize here: states may feel a reputational pressure to 
conform to the underlying beliefs about the conduct of other states, and they 
may also use information provided by other states to make their own opinion. 
As states start to follow other states, which in turn followed other states, they 
may be driven further and further away from what an unbiased and 
independent judgment would reveal. An arbitrary or malicious accusation 
may be endlessly repeated and destroy a state’s reputation beyond repair. 
Another distortion that can occur when states deliberate among 
themselves over the actions of other states results from the limited pool of 
arguments—such as specific or general accusations—available within the 
group of deliberating states. If states are only exposed to a skewed pool of 
assessments regarding a certain state—which, for example, views that state 
as a bad actor—the process of deliberation will push the assessments of that 
state to greater and greater extremes.182 
 
 180. See supra notes 13–14; see also Scott Leckie, The Inter-State Complaint Procedure in 
International Human Rights Law: Hopeful Prospects or Wishful Thinking?, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 249, 254 
(1988). 
 181. See Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 161–63 
(2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 78 
(2000); see also generally CASS. R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK 
TO MAKE GROUPS SMARTER (2015). 
 182. See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 89–90. 
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These potential distortions in the formation of states’ reputation suggest 
that leaving it to the states to control the information on the conduct of other 
states may not be a good idea. To depoliticize this system, the community 
should be expanded to actors that have less to lose from saying the truth. 
This is where NGOs enter the picture. NGOs are not as vulnerable to revenge 
by accused states. They do not have global financial and security interests 
that can be easily jeopardized. If many NGOs submit reports about a state, 
they are unlikely to be systematically biased by political alliances. They do 
not have old scores to settle by false or exaggerated accusations, and they 
have less to gain by keeping quiet in the face of injustice. If NGOs have 
dispositions, they are less entrenched and less uniform than those of states 
and are therefore less likely to reverberate and echo. The inevitable 
inaccuracies in NGO reports are likely to balance themselves out and lead to 
stable and fair reputations. 
Furthermore, because NGOs are so diverse in their views and their 
interests, they are likely to present assessments that are less uniform than the 
ones of the states. This could prevent the exclusion of certain views or 
arguments from the agenda and minimize the chances of polarizing views by 
deliberation among actors with similar assessments. Unlike states, NGOs are 
not part of an exclusive club, and the social ties between them are far less 
pronounced than between states. Experimental evidence suggests that groups 
that do not share a common identity are less likely to go to extremes than 
more cohesive groups, because they can foster divergent arguments and 
contain less social pressure to conform.183 
NGOs possess another significant advantage: their purpose as an 
institution defines a precise role for them. They are expected to criticize 
states for human rights violations, unlike state representatives that have to 
maneuver between a series of diplomatic challenges. Many NGOs focus 
specifically on certain states, on certain types of violations, or quite often on 
certain violations within certain states. This means that NGOs have narrowly 
defined roles. Narrowly defined roles, known to the participants in the 
 
 183. Id. at 90–92. One way to think about this problem is through so called “threshold models.” 
Imagine that every member of the group has a certain threshold—a number of accusations she must hear 
from others before she issues an accusation of her own. The number of accusers one needs to hear 
plausibly depends on the relationship with these individuals. Specifically, the influence of people one is 
closely connected to is probably much greater than the influence of strangers. This suggests that in groups 
where people are closely connected to one another thresholds are more likely to be crossed and false 
rumors would spread more easily. See Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 
AMER. J. SOC. 1420, 1423, 1429 (1978). The implication is that the group of state representatives who 
are closely connected to one another are more likely to form strings of false accusations than NGOs who 
are not so densely connected. 
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dialogue, have been shown in experiments to improve the dissemination of 
information within groups.184 
These insights from social science again suggest that opening the arena 
for the meaningful deliberation of NGOs can prevent the views on states’ 
reputations from polarizing in a way that is deceptive and misleading. 
Admittedly, NGOs have their own sinister incentives, but some of them 
work in favor, not against, the system of reputation. NGOs thrive on 
publicity. They need publicity to change the world, and most of them need 
publicity to raise funds and survive.185 There is nothing that helps get 
publicity more than saucy gossip, and saucy gossip is usually counter-
intuitive.186 If an NGO can tarnish an otherwise flawless reputation, it is 
guaranteed to make headlines. This is consistent with this Article’s finding 
that NGOs focus their attention on high-reputation states, making reputation 
so difficult to accumulate and turning it—in the manner discussed in Part 
VI—into a credible signal on states’ future actions. 
NGOs need publicity to catch the attention of donors, but to get them to 
open their wallets they need to win their sympathy as well. This raises the 
specter of NGOs that cater to the interest of powerful players: rich tycoons 
or, more commonly, governments. These corrupted NGOs—that some refer 
to as GONGOs187—can sometimes be even more dangerous than 
governments acting in the open. They allow governments to throw mud with 
impunity, hiding behind the anonymity provided by cheaply maintained 
organizations. If such accusations become the norm, the high hopes of 
transparency generated by NGO involvement will soon be eclipsed by a 
system of veiled accusations that no state is accountable for.188 
 
 184. See SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 181, at 111–12. 
 185. See Dothan, supra note 111. The constant struggle for publicity may affect the issues NGOs 
focus on. See James Ron et al., Transnational Informational Politics: NGO Human Right Reporting, 
1986-2000, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 557, 573 (2005) (suggesting that Amnesty International selected the 
countries it reported on not only due to human rights conditions, but also due to so-called “information 
politics.” It focused on powerful countries and on countries exposed to media coverage, among other 
factors, to attract public attention and potential funds). 
 186. See BURT, supra note 177, at 110. 
 187. See Mauro Palma, The Possible Contribution of International Civil Society to the Protection of 
Human Rights, in REALIZING UTOPIA – THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 76, 81 (Antonio Cassese 
ed., 2012). 
 188. This raises memories of the terrible Lion’s Mouth where innocent Venetians were daily accused 
by cowardly invisible enemies. See generally MARK TWAIN, THE INNOCENTS ABROAD (1869) (describing 
the Lion’s Mouth: a hole in the wall used in Venice when it was ruled by the Patricians to slip notes 
accusing people anonymously of plotting against the government. Many innocents were accused by their 
enemies and tried in secret by masked unnamed judges that composed the Council of Three. Chances to 
escape a death sentence were slim). 
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This is a danger that cannot be ignored, but should not be exaggerated. 
Indeed, NGOs are easily constructed, but they must struggle for years to gain 
a reputation for credibility and truthfulness. NGOs that have achieved such 
a reputation are unlikely to risk forfeiting it by serving states’ interests. 
NGOs that did not build this reputation will not be believed by the 
international community. 
Furthermore, while the accusations lodged against states may not reveal 
the true identity of the states that initiated the accusations—raising the 
possibility that low-reputation states are secretly supporting the accusations 
of NGOs against high-reputation states—these accusations are not judged in 
secret. They are judged by public opinion based on a reservoir of reports that 
is open to all: to contribute, to respond, and to criticize. Opening the arena 
for other views minimizes the echo effect. It lets accusations compete in the 
realm of ideas and arguments, where the best reports stand a fair chance of 
winning. More than anything, Part II of this Article suggests that this 
marketplace of ideas actually works: NGOs are focusing their attention on 
severe violations and on issues of real legal importance. The system did not 
spiral out of control. 
CONCLUSION 
The DEJ website compiles information gathered from numerous NGOs 
about the compliance of states with ECHR judgments. This technological 
and institutional novelty makes it increasingly easy for states to monitor each 
other’s human rights behavior. It is a new reality that states collectively gain 
from as it builds reputation into a useful method for predicting state behavior, 
thus facilitating efficient interactions between states. 
The focus on severe and important issues ensures that relevant 
information about state practice is exposed. The exposure of information 
ensures that significant violations by the states will not go unnoticed. This 
means that states that possess high reputations earned them by compliance 
with their international obligations, making the system of reputation a viable 
tool for assessing states’ behavior.189 
The focus of NGO attention may reveal which type of state can lose 
more from reputational sanctions. Presumably, NGOs try to shame states 
because they want them to change their behavior, or at least to be punished 
for their bad practices. NGOs would probably not invest resources for 
nothing. They would focus their attention on states that have a lot to lose 
 
 189. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 
2012 (2002) (arguing that the availability of accurate information about states’ conduct is crucial, if the 
participation of states in human rights regimes is to serve as an effective signal). 
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from reputational sanctions against them. If that is indeed the case, then the 
focus of NGOs on high-reputation states indicates that a high-reputation state 
is harmed more by a similar reputational sanction than would a low-
reputation state. That is good news for the international system of reputation. 
In fact, this finding supports a key assumption made in the literature on 
reputation. High-reputation states are often assumed to lose more from 
reputational sanctions based on the intuition that when they violate 
international law they act contrary to the prior expectations of the 
international community and therefore cause a greater shift in these 
expectations than would a non-compliant low-reputation state.190 This, in 
turn, gives high-reputation states an incentive to undertake costly actions to 
preserve their reputation, actions that low-reputation states would not take. 
If high-reputation states suffer more from reputational sanctions than 
low-reputation states, this suggests that earning reputational capital involves 
constantly increasing costs. If earning reputational capital becomes 
increasingly difficult as a state increases its reputation, only states that are 
willing to sustain significant costs will possess high reputations. This 
reputation sets them apart from the other states. In other words, it is a costly 
signal of their character, and therefore a credible one.191 
But what are states signaling when they incur the costs necessary to 
maintain their reputation? A possible answer is that they indicate they care 
more about their future international standing than they care about avoiding 
immediate costs. Adherence to international law per se is important to other 
states. But it is the willingness to incur immediate costs to do so that really 
makes a difference for the states’ reputation. The willingness to sacrifice 
benefits in the present in the hope of gaining more in the future is often 
termed “low discount rate.”192 States with a low discount rate will be justly 
 
 190. See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International 
Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 510 (2005); GUZMAN, supra note 174, at 83; DOTHAN, supra note 95, at 
13. 
 191. See MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND 
RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES 16–20 (1974) (developing the theory of signaling to counter situations 
of asymmetric information); AMOTZ & AVISHAG ZAHAVI, THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE – A MISSING PIECE 
OF DARWIN’S PUZZLE XIV (1997) (studying a similar system of signals developed by evolution in the 
animal kingdom. Male peacocks, for example, grow big and cumbersome tails that signal to the females 
they are able to escape from predators even despite the tail’s weight); see generally Michael Spence, Job 
Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973). 
 192. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (2002) (explaining 
how states that enforce human rights protections signal their low discount rate); David H. Moore, A 
Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 879 (2003) (explaining how states 
that comply with international human rights obligations signal their low discount rate); ERIC A. POSNER, 
LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 116 (2000) (explaining how everyday behaviors, such as taking the effort to 
display the national flag, can signal the low discount rate of individuals). 
DOTHAN - FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2017  12:11 PM 
2017] A VIRTUAL WALL OF SHAME 189 
perceived as states that are unlikely to break their commitments in pursuit of 
quick gains. Such states are considered good treaty partners and 
consequently get better deals in international negotiations. These high-
reputation states are therefore compensated for their efforts to maintain 
international law, but only in future transactions. It is the readiness to 
sacrifice the present for the future that sets high-reputation states apart from 
low-reputation states.193 States that are concerned about the future can be 
justly perceived as good collaborators that will stay true to their word despite 
occasional temptations to breach their obligations. 
States that were caught violating human rights by the ECHR may lose 
reputation as a result of shaming by NGOs. But they also gain a significant 
advantage—they are able to respond to accusations against them and, most 
importantly, they can rebuild their reputation by complying with judgments 
to the satisfaction of the CM. A structured process to shape reputation is not 
important just for states that conduct themselves perfectly. It also creates a 
workable method of repentance—allowing states to regain reputation by 
changing their behavior.194 
 
 193. See GUZMAN, supra note 174, at 35. Yet, reputation is not always a prefect tool to predict 
behavior. See George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance and Development, in THE 
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION – THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
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Compliance, 1 INT’L THEORY 323, 326, 328 (2009) (voicing the concern that governments have a short 
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reputation). 
 194. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of The Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations In The 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 126 (1992) (highlighting the importance of an agreed upon 
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